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MANAGING THE BURDENS IMPOSED ON
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
CALIFORNIA: THE 1992 AND 1993
AMENDMENTS TO CCP 437C
Thomas Kallay*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sixty-three years after the enactment of a law providing
for motions for summary judgment,' the California legislature
undertook to define the evidentiary burdens imposed on such
motions. This was done by adding subdivision (n) to
California's summary judgment statute, Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c.'
* J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; A.B., University of
California, Los Angeles. The author is a sole practitioner specializing in
appellate practice in Los Angeles, California.
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 831d, 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 494, at 857-58
(repealed 1933). An early form of summary judgment came into existence in
California in 1925 when the legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section
831f. This provision remained in effect only until 1929. Under section 831f,
summary judgment could be entered after a hearing if there were no substantial
factual conflicts. See 1925 Cal. Stat. ch. 436, at 946. Section 831f required oral
proceedings in open court. Unlike summary judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 83 1d, which replaced it, section 83 if was not a motion procedure.
2. California Civil Procedure Code section 831d, 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 494,
was repealed in 1933 in favor of California Civil Procedure Code section 437c,
which has remained California's summary judgment statute. Section 437c
reads in relevant part:
(n) For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary
adjudication:
(1) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of
showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party
has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party
to judgment on that cause of action. Once the plaintiff or
cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto.
(2) A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
Until the legislature enacted subdivision (n) in 1992,'
decisional law defined the burden imposed on the party moving
for summary judgment. Under Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools,'
the burdens imposed on motions for summary judgment were
substantial. Barnes imposed on the party moving for summary
judgment not only the burden of production,' whether or not it
would bear that burden at trial,6 but also required the moving
party to present sufficient evidence to shift the burden of
production to the opponent of the motion.7 The party moving
for summary judgment had to negate the opponent's case before
the motion could be granted.' This meant that the party
moving for summary judgment was required to propound
evidence of sufficient probative force to show that it was
entitled to judgment, even if it did not bear the burdens of proof
and production at trial.'
Barnes was not an aberration. Until the United States
Supreme Court decided Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,0 federal and
California law on the burden of the party moving for summary
judgment were for all practical purposes identical."
Celotex abrogated the federal rule that imposed an
showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown
that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not
separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant or
cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action.
In 1993 subdivision (n) became subdivision (o). See infra note 20 and
accompanying text.
3. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1348, at 6702-03.
4. 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
5. See discussion infra Part I.C. The burden of producing evidence, or the
burden of production, is the "[o]bligation of a party to introduce evidence
sufficient to avoid a ruling against him on the issue." CAL. EVID. CODE § 110
(West 2000). The burden of production is central to summary judgment and is
not to be confused with the burden of proof, i.e., the obligation of a party to
establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of
the trier of fact. See id. at § 115.
6. See Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447; see also discussion infra Part I.D.
7. See discussion infra Part I.D. The burden of production is shifted to the
opponent when the proponent produces evidence of such probative force that a
determination in its favor is required in the absence of countervailing evidence.
See Cal. EVID. CODE § 550 (citing Law Revision Commission Comment to
section 550).
8. See Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
9. See id.
10. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
11. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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evidentiary burden on motions for summary judgment without
regard to the allocation of the burdens of proof and production 2
at trial and ultimately displaced Barnes as the law of California
summary judgment. 3
The changes that Celotex wrought in federal law and
practice were the subject of much debate and discussion after
the decision came down in 1986.14 The terms of this debate
were complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court handed
down two other important decisions about summary judgment
at about the same time it decided Celotex.'5 However, in
hindsight, the weight of authority is that, after Celotex,
federal courts do not require the party moving for summary
judgment to introduce any evidence in order to prevail on a
summary judgment motion when that party does not bear the
burdens of proof and production at trial. 6 Celotex has not had
a like effect on California summary judgment. 7
In California, the direct significance of Celotex is that it
helped to bring about subdivision (n) of the Code of Civil
12. See discussion infra Part I.B.
13. See discussion infra Part I.E.
14. See EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT - FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (1994). Chapters 2 and 3 canvass the cases and commentary on
Celotex and its significance to federal summary judgment. The response of the
lower federal courts to Celotex was to reduce or even ignore the evidentiary
burden imposed on the party moving for summary judgment. See id. at 60-63.
Early commentary on Celotex was divided between those who welcomed the
decision as strengthening summary judgment in its role in identifying factually
unsupported cases (see, eg., Jack Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment:
Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770
(1988); John Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v.
Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6
REV. LITIG. 227 (1987)) and those who concluded that Celotex created more
confusion than light about the evidentiary burdens imposed on motions for
summary judgment. See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming
the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 433 (1987); Melissa Nelken, One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 53 (1988).
15. These two decisions are of limited relevance to this paper. They are
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
16. See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2727, at 474 (3d ed. 1998). "[A]s established in Celotex, it is not
necessary for the movant to introduce any evidence in order to prevail on
summary judgment." Id. (citing, inter alia, Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth
Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also 11 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 1997).
17. See discussion infra Part I.F.
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Procedure section 437c in 199218 and further amendments in
1993 when, among other things, 9 subdivision (n) became
subdivision (o).0 As the California Court of Appeals's review of
the legislative history of the 1992 and 1993 amendments2'
demonstrates, one of the objectives of the 1992 and 1993
amendments to section 437c was to legislatively overrule
Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools.22 The statute that accomplished
18. See supra note 2; see also discussion infra Part I.E.
19. In 1993, section 437c was amended with provisions relating to summary
adjudication (see subdivision (m)(1)-(2), Cal. Stat. ch. 276, at 1972 (1993)) and
with a new subdivision (n) that defined when a cause of action "has no merit." "A
cause of action has no merit if either of the following exists: (1) One or more
elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that
element has been separately pleaded. (2) The defendant establishes an affirmative
defense to that cause of action." Cal. Stat. ch. 276, at 1973. Subdivision (n) then
became subdivision (o). The 1993 amendment also provided that the party
opposing the motion could not rely on its pleadings to show that a triable issue of
material fact existed but "shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable
issue of material fact exists .... ." Id. This has been the law since 1950 when
Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal. 2d 257 (1950), was decided.
20. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West 2000) reads in relevant part:
(o) For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary
adjudication:
(1) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of
showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party
has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party
to judgment on that cause of action. Once the plaintiff or
cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto. The defendant or cross-defendant may not rely upon the
mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable
issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific
facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto.
(2) A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown
that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not
separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant or
cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant may not rely upon the
mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable
issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific
facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto.
Id. (italics indicate 1993 amendments).
21. See Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (1995).
22. 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
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this relieved the party moving for summary judgment of the
burden of producing evidence of probative force sufficient to
shift the burden of production to the opponent of the motion.23
However, it did not relieve the moving party from its obligation,
set forth in subdivision (b) of section 437c, to support the
statement of undisputed material facts with references to the
evidence.24 The legislature was not alone in deciding to
repudiate Barnes. A resolution by the State Bar of California
supporting the abrogation of the rule of Barnes played a role in
bringing about the enactment of these amendments in both
houses of the legislature.25
It turned out that the legislature accomplished far more
than to simply overrule Barnes. The 1992 and 1993
amendments to section 437c also made summary judgment
consistent with the concept of the burden of proof and
production as well as with the standard of the sufficiency of
the evidence.26 Largely as a result of the 1992 and 1993
amendments and the interpretation they have received in the
courts of appeal, summary judgment fits much more smoothly
into the machinery of California civil procedure than was the
case prior to these amendments.
A Developments in the United States Supreme Court: from
Adickes to Celotex
The development of federal law on the burdens imposed
on the parties to a motion for summary judgment has been
traced authoritatively elsewhere.27 This paper covers the
development only to the extent that these developments help
explain the amendments to section 437c enacted by the
California legislature in 1992 and 1993.
The "traditional" federal rule on motions for summary
judgment required all movants including those who did
not have the production burden at trial, "[T]o shift an
evidentiary burden onto their opponents. This initial
'triggering' burden was generally deemed to be equivalent
to the evidentiary burden placed on a party possessing the
23. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c(o) (formerly codified at § 437c(n), see
supra note 2).
24. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b); see also discussion infra Part I.F-
I.F.2.
25. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
26. See discussion infra Part I.C.
27. See, e.g., BRUNET ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.02, at 44-65.
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burden of production at trial when seeking a directed
verdict. In other words, the movant would be required
effectively to shift a burden of production onto the
nonmovant, by producing evidence sufficient to require a
rational finder of fact to find in his favor."28
The traditional federal rule imposed a greater burden on
the party moving for summary judgment than on a party
moving for directed verdict on the same set of facts.29 The law
does not require a party moving for directed verdict to
propound evidence to disprove the opponent's case."
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.3" is a case which prominently
illustrates the traditional approach. The plaintiff in this civil
rights case was Sandra Adickes, a white woman, who had
been refused lunch service in defendant Kress's store in
Hattiesburg while in the company of six African American
students. After service was refused, Adickes was arrested for
vagrancy by two policemen.12 Adickes had to show that a
conspiracy existed between Kress and the police officers.3
Kress moved for summary judgment based on the
affidavits of the store manager, the two arresting officers, and
the chief of police, all of which stated that the store manager
28. Id. The "traditional rule" held sway in the days of the Warren Court in
such decisions as First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1967), and
Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem'l Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700 (1969),
and enjoyed the support of prominent commentators. See, eg., Martin Louis,
Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745,
752 (1974) (citing 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 56.15[3], at 2342). The
occasional critical comment pointed out that imposing a stringent burden on the
moving party weakened the role of summary judgment in identifying factually
deficient cases, a role taken over from the demurrer, i.e., the motion to dismiss,
and assigned to summary judgment. See, e.g., id. at 754. Thus, Professor Louis
argued in 1974 that it should be enough if the moving party demonstrates the
probability, rather than the "near certainty," that the opposing party could not
get to the jury at trial. Id. at 753. Professor Louis conceded that "[n]o
discovered opinion" supported such a test. Id. See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Also see infra Part I.C. for a short summary of
California law defining the burden of production and the burden of proof and
the significance of the former to summary judgment.
29. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.02, at 46 (citing Adickes, 398 U.S.
at 144 and 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, at § 56.15[3).
30. See 7 WITHIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE §§ 419, 431 (4th ed. 1997) (only
the nonmovant's evidence is considered on a motion for directed verdict or
nonsuit).
31. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
32. See id. at 146-48.
33. See id. at 148, 150-52.
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had not requested that Adickes be arrested."4 Kress also
relied on the fact that Adickes had admitted in her deposition
that she had no personal knowledge of any communication
between any Kress employee and the police. 5 Adickes's
theory in opposition to the motion was that police officers had
been present in the store on the day she was arrested. She
supported this theory with two inadmissible statements, i.e.,
one an unsworn statement and the other a hearsay
statement.36 Thus, Adickes effectively failed to controvert the
facts upon which Kress's motion was predicated, although her
submissions indicated that she could well obtain admissible
evidence on this issue. At trial, Adickes would undoubtedly
have had the production burden 7 on the existence of a
conspiracy between Kress and the police. Thus, if Kress had
moved for directed verdict on the same set of facts, the court
would have granted the motion since Adickes had propounded
no substantial, admissible evidence that the conspiracy
existed and would have therefore failed to meet the
production burden on this material issue.
Not surprisingly, the district court granted Kress's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Adickes
had failed to show any facts from which a conspiracy could be
inferred.38 The court of appeals affirmed.39
The Supreme Court reversed. As the Court explained,
Kress had failed to exclude the possibility that police officers
had been present in the store the day Adickes had been
arrested. ° If an officer had been present, the jury could have
reasonably inferred that the officer and Kress's employees
had a "meeting of the minds" and reached an understanding
that Adickes should be arrested. The presence or absence of
an officer in the store was a "critical element" of the case and
Kress had failed to show that no officer had been in the
store.41 In effect, the Court held that a party moving for
summary judgment had to produce sufficient evidence to
require a judgment in its favor. Thus, unless the party
34. See id. at 148, 153-56.
35. See id. at 157.
36. See id. at 156.
37. See discussion infra Part I.C.
38. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 148 (1970).
39. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157-58.
41. See id. at 158.
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moving for summary judgment was able to show that it was
entitled to judgment, the law did not obligate the nonmovant
to respond to the motion, which the court would in any event
deny. This was the case even though the nonmovant had the
production burden at trial on the dispositive issue.
Accordingly, if Kress's showing had included evidence that no
policemen had been in the store, Kress would have been
entitled to summary judgment."'
Until 1992 when California enacted subdivision (n) of
section 437c, California law conformed to the traditional
federal rule set forth in Adickes.43 However, while Celotex
Corp. v. Cattret did not overrule Adickes, or even expressly
repudiate what had been generally perceived as the
"traditional" federal rule, it did offer a "construction" of
Adickes that was at odds with the general understanding of
the evidentiary requirements under the "traditional" rule up
to that point.
The plaintiff in Celotex alleged that the cause of the
decedent's death was exposure to the defendant's asbestos
products.4' The defendant moved for summary judgment and
the motion was granted because the plaintiff was unable to
show that the defendant's acts or products had caused the
decedent's death. 5
The court of appeals reversed in an opinion that lucidly
stated the "traditional" view and explicitly relied on Adickes .
The court acknowledged that the plaintiff would bear the
burden of production at trial on the issue of causation and
that her case would be vulnerable to a motion for directed
verdict if she failed to meet that burden.47 However, a party
moving for summary judgment carried "the burden of proving
the absence of a material issue of fact 'even on issues where
the other party would have the burden of proof at trial.' 48
Since the defendant had not supported its motion with
42. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 14.
43. See discussion infra Part I.D.
44. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 319 (1985).
45. See id. at 320. The plaintiff in Celotex actually had evidence of exposure
of the decedent to asbestos. This evidence had been submitted in opposition to
an earlier motion for summary judgment by the defendant. See id.
46. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
47. See id. at 184-85.
48. Id.
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evidence "tending to negate" that the decedent had been
exposed to defendant's asbestos products, summary judgment
had been incorrectly granted.49
Without overruling Adickes, the Supreme Court reversed.
However, the Court substituted for what had been heretofore
a relatively clear, if not exacting, standard with one that is
both less clear and less exacting. Under the traditional
Adickes standard the moving party had to propound evidence
sufficient to require a rational finder of fact to find in its favor
even if the nonmoving party had the burden of production at
trial. After Celotex, however, the movant bears no such
burden.
Following Celotex, the burden on the moving party "may
be discharged by 'showing' - that is pointing out to the
district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case."" As for Adickes, the Court held
that it should "not be construed to mean that the burden is on
the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even
with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears
the burden of proof."5 While it is not exactly clear what
"showing" means, Celotex makes this much clear: it certainly
does not mean that the moving party must make an
evidentiary showing."
Even though it is somewhat uncertain what was meant
by "pointing out to the district court," the passage of years
has shown that the alarms that sounded about the
ambiguities of Celotex53 were to an extent overblown. After
all, Celotex also held that a party moving for summary
judgment in federal court must inform the court of the basis
49. See id. at 185.
50. Celotex Corp., 447 U.S. at 325 (1985).
51. Id.
52. See id. One writer has made an effort to reconcile Adickes and Celotex
by pointing out that the moving party's affidavits in the former case showed
there was an issue of fact because the moving party's own affidavits suggested
that there might have been a policeman in the store. In Celotex, on the other
hand, the moving party's affidavits suggested no factual issue. This justified the
denial of summary judgment in Adickes and the granting of summary judgment
in Celotex. See Kennedy, supra note 14 at 246. However, this suggestion does
not address the clear language found in Celotex that the moving party does not
have the burden of showing the absence of an issue of fact if the burden of proof
is not on that party at trial. See id.
53. See supra note 14.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
of its motion and "identify those portions of the 'pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with any affidavits, if any' which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."54
Thus, the moving party in federal summary judgment must
certainly do more than simply argue that the opponent's case
is not supported by any evidence."5 In any event, it is clear
that the law does not require that the party moving for
summary judgment in federal court support the motion with
an evidentiary showing if that party does not bear the
burdens of proof and production at trial.56
B. The Burden of Proof, the Burden of Producing Evidence,
and Summary Judgment
In referring to the burdens of the party moving for
summary judgment and the party opposing the motion,
California appellate decisions sometimes characterize those
burdens as the "burden of proof."7 Whether this is correct or
not depends on which of two possible meanings of "burden of
proof' is intended.
"The term 'burden of proof is often used in two senses: (a)
the secondary meaning of the burden of initially producing or
going forward with the evidence. (b) The primary meaning of
the burden of proving the issues of the case." 8 If "burden of
proof' is understood to refer to the burden of producing
evidence, references to the "burden of proof' when discussing
summary judgment are appropriate. It is the burden of
producing evidence, or the production burden, that is the
standard that applies to summary judgment.59
The "burden of proof' in its primary meaning is resolved
in front of and by the jury. When a case gets to the jury, the
54. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
55. See 11 MOORE ET AL, supra note 16, § 56.13[l], at 56-136 (citing, inter
alia, Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1989))
(movant cannot meet its burden merely by asserting that summary judgment
should be granted; movant must direct court's attention to the legal and factual
contentions and the material relied on in support of the motion); see also 10A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2727, at 472 (detailing the ways in which a
movant can satisfy his burden to show that there are no genuine issues of fact).
56. See 1OAWRIGHTETAL.,supra note 16, § 2727.
57. See, eg., Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 659 (Ct.
App. 1995).
58. 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 127, at 113-14 (3d ed. 1986).
59. See infra pp. 111-14.
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proponent of that case must meet its burden of proof.
"'Burden of proof [in its primary sense] means the obligation
of a party to establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief
concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the
court." ° On the other hand, the burden to produce evidence is
the burden to satisfy the judge that the party has a quantity
of evidence "fit to be considered by the jury and to form a
reasonable basis for the verdict."6 The burden to produce
evidence is a "duty toward the judge" and the judge will rule
against the party if the burden is not satisfied.62
The concept of the production burden is addressed to the
court's function, not the jury's. It is simply a device
whereby the court determines whether, if the trial were
stopped at any given point, it would send the case to the
jury. If not, the court decides the case and the jury has no
role to play. If the case is sent to the jury, the production
burden drops out of the case and has no role to play. The
jury will be concerned only with the persuasion burden
[burden of proof in its primary sense] .63
As the Evidence Code puts it somewhat cryptically, the
"'[b]urden of producing evidence' means the obligation of a
party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling
against him on the issue."
A motion for summary judgment is not decided by the
trier of fact but by the judge, nor is it decided in terms of the
"requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the
trier of fact."' Thus, a motion for summary judgment is not
decided in terms of the burden of proof in its primary sense.
This is self-evident.66
It is the burden of producing evidence or the production
burden that provides the standard for determining the
60. CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 2000).
61. 9 JOHN A. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2487
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1995).
62. See id.
63. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.7, at 325-26 (4th ed.
1992).
64. CAL. EVID. CODE § 110 (West 2000); see also id. at § 550(a) ("The burden
of producing evidence as to a particular fact is on the party against whom a
finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further evidence.").
65. See id at § 115.
66. "The notion of a burden of persuasion speaks to assessing the quality
and quantity of proffered proof, a task within the jury's province. Therefore, it
is an inappropriate function for the judge on a .summary adjudication."
Mullenix, supra note 14, at 471.
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sufficiency of evidence presented on a motion for summary
judgment.67
The production burden has two aspects. First, it is the
party with the production burden who has the duty of going
forward with the evidence at trial.68 Second, the production
burden requires the party with that burden to produce
sufficient evidence. Summary judgment is not concerned with
the first of these aspects since it applies to trials. However,
summary judgment is greatly concerned with the legal
sufficiency of the evidence. The party moving for summary
judgment as well as the opponent of the motion must produce
evidence that is sufficient, that is, evidence that meets a
certain standard.
The standard by which it is determined whether the
evidence is sufficient depends on whether the evidence is
direct or circumstantial.69 Direct evidence is evidence that
directly proves a fact, without an inference or presumption,
and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact.7°
Thus, direct evidence offered in support of a proposition will
"justify or warrant a finding by the trier that the fact
existed."7' Certainly, nothing more can be asked of the
67. "The standard for granting summary judgment, like both the directed
verdict and judgment n.o.v. motions, is concerned exclusively with the burden of
production." BRUNET ET AL., supra note 14, at 45. "The only true burdens that
exist at summary judgment are burdens of production of evidence; whether
these production burdens have been satisfied is the relevant issue in
considering the motion." Mullenix, supra note 14, at 471.
68. See 9 WIGMORE, supra note 61, § 2487.
69. See People v. Goldstein 293 P.2d 495, 499-500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)
(citing Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal. 2d 457, 460 (1942)):
[D]irect evidence is that which is applied to the fact to be proved,
immediately and directly, and without the aid of any intervening fact
or process: as where, on a trial for murder, a witness positively testifies
he saw the accused inflict the mortal wound, or administer the poison.
Circumstantial evidence is that which is applied to the principal fact,
indirectly, or through the medium of other facts, from which the
principal fact is inferred. The characteristics of circumstantial
evidence, as distinguished from that which is direct, are, first, the
existence and presentation of one or more evidentiary facts; and,
second, a process of inference, by which these facts are so connected
with the fact sought, as to tend to produce a persuasion of its truth. An
inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a material fact that a
trier of fact may properly draw from the existence of certain primary
facts.
Id. (citations omitted)
70. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 410.
71. JAMES, JR. ETAL., supra note 63, § 7.11, at 341.
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proponent than to propound a fact, which, if true,
"conclusively establishes a fact." It is also logical that if the
moving party propounds no evidence, the showing cannot be
sufficient.72
For circumstantial evidence, the rule at trial is that the
inference the proponent seeks to draw must be more
reasonable or probable than the conflicting inference.73 The
proponent has not met its burden when conflicting inferences
to be drawn from the evidence are of equal weight.74
However, circumstantial evidence "need not rise to that
degree of certainty which will exclude every reasonable
conclusion other than that arrived by the jury."75 This rule is
fair and logical. No more can be fairly expected of a party
who relies on circumstantial evidence than a showing that
the inference on which it relies is more probable than the
conflicting inference.
The court of appeals has applied these settled principles
to motions for summary judgment." This is eminently correct
and sensible. One of the functions of summary judgment is to
eliminate cases that should never go to trial.77 The court will
eliminate a case that is factually insufficient at trial by a
motion for directed verdict, nonsuit, or judgment n.o.v. Much
time and expense is saved if the court terminates such a case
prior to trial and this is, of course, one of the leading
rationales for summary judgment. Thus, if the proponent
relies on circumstantial evidence to support its position in a
motion for summary judgment, the inference that it seeks to
draw must be more probable or reasonable than the
conflicting inference.
72. There are reported cases where it was found that the party moving for
summary judgment had no evidence on a point critical to its motion. See, e.g.,
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d
821, 823 (Ct. App. 1997).
73. See 3 WITKIN, supra note 58, § 1796, at 1753.
74. See, eg., San Joaquin Grocery Co. v. Trewhitt 252 P. 332, 333 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1926); 3 WITKIN, supra note 58, § 1796, at 1753; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 242 (5th ed. 1984).
75. Chalmers v. Hawkins, 248 P. 727, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926); 3 WITIUN,
supra note 58, § 1796, at 1753.
76. See Leslie G. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 791-94 (Ct. App.
1996); see also discussion infra Part I.F.4.
77. See Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802, 815
("The purpose of summary judgment is to separate those cases in which there
are material issues of fact meriting a trial from those in which there are no such
issues.").
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The rule requiring the proponent to produce sufficient
evidence is not always expressed directly. Thus, it has been
said that a "scintilla" of evidence is not enough"8 and that a
party cannot rely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture."9
However, the best statement of the rule when a party relies
on circumstantial evidence in a motion for summary
judgment is that the inference the party relies on must be
more probable or reasonable than the conflicting inference. If
the proponent's inference is as likely or as reasonable as the
conflicting inference, the proponent's evidence is insufficient. °
This is the identical rule on a motion for directed verdict. The
opponent of a motion for directed verdict must produce
"evidence of sufficient substantiality"81 in order to defeat a
motion for directed verdict."R
C. The Burden of the Party Moving for Summary Judgment
in California Prior to 1992.
In 1939, the legislature amended section 437c to give
defendants the right to move for summary judgment." This
required an amendment of the statute setting forth the
defendant's objective in such a motion since previously the
plaintiffs objective on a motion for summary judgment was
stated by the statute to be that there was "no defense to the
action." The 1939 amendment to section 437c accordingly
provided that the defendant's objective in a motion for
summary judgment was to show that "the action has no
merit."
8
'
If, as a general matter, the moving party has the burden
78. A "[miere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs (nonmovant's)
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
252 (1986). That there once was a "scintilla rule" is a "judicial legend"
mentioned in the 1800's only to be repudiated. See JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra
note 63, § 7.11, at 340.
79. See Leslie G., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791; see also discussion infra Part
I.F.4.
80. See Leslie G., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
81. See 7 WITKIN, supra note 30, § 419 (citing In re Estate of Lances, 216
Cal. 397, 400 (1932)).
82. In the context of directed verdict and nonsuit, California has expressly
abrogated the "scintilla of evidence" rule and requires "substantial" evidence to
defeat motions for directed verdict/nonsuit/judgment n.o.v. See 7 WITI[N, supra
note 30, §§ 419-20, 432.
83. See 1939 Cal. Stat. ch. 331, at 1671.
84. See id.
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in any motion, and if the objective of a defendant's motion for
summary judgment is to show that the "action has no merit,"
it is logical to conclude that the defendant has the burden to
prove exactly that, i.e., that the plaintiffs action had no
merit. When the courts added to this that the party moving
for summary judgment had to show that it was "entitled to
judgment,"85 it was but a small step to conclude that the
defendant had an affirmative obligation to produce evidence to
prove that the opponent could not support its case with any
evidence.
There is also a less logical and a more policy-based
reason to impose a relatively severe evidentiary burden on
the party moving for summary judgment without regard to
whether that party bears the burdens of proof and production
at trial. That reason is a belief that summary judgment is an
abridgment of, or at least a threat to, the right of a trial by
jury and that recourse to summary judgment should therefore
be circumscribed, if not discouraged.
There is evidence that the initial judicial attitude toward
summary judgment in California included a strong measure
of skepticism, if not distrust, of summary judgment. In its
first two substantive decisions on summary judgment, Walsh
v. Walsh" and Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice,87 the
California Supreme Court warned that summary judgment
was a "drastic remedy" that should be used "with caution," a
mantra that was to be repeated endlessly in the years to
come. Even further, it was also said that summary judgment
was a "disfavored" remedy.88 This point of view has been
repudiated.8
Whether for reasons of policy or logic, or possibly both,
California courts opted to require the party moving for
summary judgment to propound evidence of such probative
force as to shift the burden of production,° even if the burdensof proof and production were to be borne at trial by the party
85. See, e.g., De Echeguren v. De Echeguren, 26 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (Ct.
App. 1962).
86. 18 Cal. 2d 439, 444 (1941).
87. 19 Cal. 2d 553, 557 (1942).
88. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1107 (1988); Sprecher v.
Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 372 (1981).
89. See Caldwell v. Paramount Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 448, 457-
58 (Ct. App. 1995).
90. See infra Part I.E. for a discussion of shifting the burden of production.
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opposing the motion. The decision held responsible for this by
the legislature91 as well as by the courts" was Barnes v. Blue
Haven Pools.93 This may be giving Barnes too much credit
since the rule that the moving party had to "establish every
element necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor" was
well in place before Barnes was decided.94 But since the
origins of this displaced rule are only a matter of historic
interest, it may be well to bow to the conventional wisdom
that ascribes this rule to Barnes.
Barnes was a personal injury action based on theories of
negligence and breach of warranties. The defendant in this
case supported its motion for summary judgment in part with
interrogatory answers that stated that the plaintiff had no
witnesses to prove negligence "at this time"95 and with a
declaration of a plaintiffs expert that he had not reached any
conclusions "in regard to safety factors."96 The Barnes court
recognized that the plaintiff would have the burden at trial to
prove negligence and that if it had no more at trial than was
disclosed in the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff
would be nonsuited.97 However, the court concluded that on a
motion for summary judgment, the "moving party must
generally negative the matters which the resisting party
would have to prove at trial."98 The reason for this was that
under section 437c the defendant had the burden of showing
that the plaintiff's action had no merit.99
Barnes shifted the production burden from the plaintiff to
91. The legislative history of the 1992 and 1993 amendments shows that the
legislature intended to set aside Barnes. See Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 657-65 (Ct. App. 1995).
92. See id. at 658-59.
93. 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
94. See De Echeguren v. De Echeguren, 26 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (Ct. App.
1962); see also Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555-56 (Ct.
App. 1965). De Echeguren goes back as far as the decision in Gardenschwartz v.
Equitable etc. Soc., 6 P.2d 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937), for the origins of this rule.
De Echeguren v. De Echeguren, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 565. Barnes itself, in addition
to Canifax, cites McClary v. Concord Ave. Motors, 21 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App.
1962), and Kramer v. Barnes, 27 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Ct. App. 1963), in support of
the proposition that the moving party must "negative the matters which the
resisting party would have to prove at trial." Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
95. Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
96. Id. at 445.
97. See id. at 447.
98. Id.
99. See id.
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the defendant. This was recognized by courts and
commentators alike.' ° On the one hand, the plaintiff did not
have the production burden for purposes of the motion for
summary judgment, for if it did, the court would have granted
the motion for summary judgment. On the other hand, it was
the defendant who had to negate the matters on which the
plaintiff had the burden at trial. That is, the court assigned
the defendant the very burden that the plaintiff bore at trial.
In effect, for the purposes of the motion for summary
judgment, this was a reallocation of the production burden.
The rule of Barnes did not only reallocate the production
burden to the party moving for summary judgment.
Requiring the moving party to "negate" the opponent's case,
as Barnes did, suggested evidence of a probative effect that
exceeded evidence that was simply sufficient. This is
confirmed by the fact that both the cases and the
commentators characterized the moving party's responsibility
as one of "proving" that the opponent's case had no merit.'0'
In addition to "proving" that the opponent's case had no
merit, other like formulations were that the defendant had to
"conclusively negate a necessary element of the plaintiffs
case,"10 2 show that the claims of the adverse party "are
entirely without merit on any legal theory,"'0 ' or show that
the moving party was "entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."'O4 The extent of the defendant's evidentiary burden was
never limited to the production of evidence that was simply
100. See, e.g., Stuart R. Pollack, Liberalizing Summary Adjudication: A
Proposal, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 419 (1985).
The moving party carries this burden regardless of whether that party
bears the burden of proof at trial. In contrast to a motion for nonsuit at
the close of a party's evidence, on a summary judgment motion the
moving party cannot point to the absence of evidence by the side that
bears the burden of proof, but must come forward with its own evidence
to disprove the facts in question.
Id. at 425 (citing Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 446; Matute v. Belco Indus., 142 Cal.
App. 3d 433, 438 (1983); Segura v. Brundage, 91 Cal. App. 3d 19, 29 (1979);
Fuller v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 7 Cal. App. 3d 690, 693 (1970)). "This is
true whether or not the disputed fact is a negative proposition, whether or not
evidence of the fact presumptively is in the possession of the opposing party,
and, indeed, whether or not the fact to be disproved is even intelligibly stated in
the opposing party's pleadings." Pollack, supra, at 425.
101. See Pollack, supra note 100, at 425.
102. Sackett v. Public Storage Management, 272 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286 (Ct.
App. 1990).
103. Ahern v. Dillenback, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 341 (Ct. App. 1991).
104. Mann v. Cracchiolo, 38 Cal. 3d 18, 35 (1985).
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sufficient to sustain the proposition. Thus, the rule of Barnes
required the party moving for summary judgment to produce
evidence of such probative force that a determination in its
favor was required in the absence of countervailing evidence.
In other words, a successful motion for summary judgment
shifted the burden of production to the opponent.05
The court cited and applied this rule with a full
understanding of its implications which prominently included
the circumstance that on the same evidence presented at
trial, the court could deny a motion for summary judgment
even though the motion revealed that the nonmovant's
evidence was so insufficient as to call for a directed verdict.'0 6
While there was some judicial hand-wringing after Barnes
about the difficulties faced by the party moving for summary
judgment, it is hard to avoid the thought that the Barnes rule
reflected a simmering antipathy toward summary judgment
that otherwise found expression in the endlessly repeated
litany that summary judgment was a drastic remedy that had
to be employed "with caution." 7
California courts proved themselves to be clear-eyed
105. See infra Part I.E. for a discussion of shifting the burden of production.
106. The court in Chevron, U.SA. v. Superior Court stated,
[Ilt is immaterial that the few facts offered by petitioners may in
reality be all that are available to the parties in the case. While this
state of the evidence could have a bearing on whether real parties can
prove their case at trial, it is irrelevant to the outcome of a motion
under section 437c, where the burden of proof is on the moving
defendant, not the responding plaintiff. (Security Pac. Nat. Bank v.
Associated Motor Sales (1980) 106 Cal. App. 3d 171, 179 [165 Cal. Rptr.
38].) We concede it is ofttimes difficult, usually time consuming,
normally expensive-and, in some instances, even impossible-for a
defendant to meet the demands of the statute. As a consequence,
certain cases simply may not lend themselves to resolution by way of
summary judgment. (Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools (1969) 1 Cal. App. 3d
123, 128 [81 Cal. Rptr. 444].) Nonetheless, the evidentiary
impediments faced by a defendant do not lessen or eliminate the
burden of proof imposed by the summary judgment law. (Conn v.
National Can Corp., supra, 124 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 639- 640.) Contrary
to petitioners' contention in its motion filed with the trial court, under
section 437c the fact the plaintiff may have "no evidence" with which to
prove its case, and is therefore likely to be nonsuited at trial, does not
warrant entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. (Barnes
v. Blue Haven Pools, supra, 1 Cal. App. 3d at p. 126; 3 Weil & Brown,
Cal Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 1991) 10.243, p.
10-59.)
5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674, 679 (Ct. App. 1992).
107. See, eg., Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 556 (1942).
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about Barnes and its progeny after the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Celotex Corp. v. Catrett °8 and before the legislature
enacted the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c. The
courts recognized the difference between Barnes and the new
federal rule as laid down in Celotex, particularly when it came
to the burden imposed by the former and not the latter on the
party moving for summary judgment.'0 9 Notwithstanding
developments in the federal courts, California courts stood
firmly behind the rule that the party moving for summary
judgment not only had the production burden but had to
produce evidence of such probative value as to shift that burden
to the opponent of the motion, even though this resulted
frequently in having to prove that the nonmovant had no
evidence.
It may be that the courts themselves could have set aside
the Barnes rule. Whether or not this might have happened
eventually is impossible to say. In any event, in 1992 the
legislature amended section 437c with the intent to overrule
Barnes. 11
D. The 1992 and 1993 Amendments to Section 437c
In enacting the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section
437c, the legislature intended to relieve the party moving for
summary judgment of the burdens that Barnes v. Blue Haven
Pools"' had imposed. Under Barnes, a party who did not bear
the burdens of proof and production was required not only to
assume the burden of production but was also required to
propound evidence of sufficient probative force to shift the
burden of production to the nonmovant. The moving party
had to show that it was entitled to judgment by negating the
opponent's case. This was a rule clearly unfavorable to
summary judgment and it was this rule that the legislature
intended to change by the 1992 and 1993 amendments."'
108. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
109. "The new federal view of summary judgment [Celotex] has not been
adopted by the courts of this state." Biljac Assocs. v. First Interstate Bank, 267
Cal. Rptr. 819, 838 (1990) (Kline, J., concurring).
110. See discussion infra Parts I.E, I.F.1.
111. 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
112. See Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
[A]fter discussing the plaintiffs burden under the proposed
amendment, the report [Sen. Com. on Jud. Com. Rep. on Assem. Bill
No. 2616] concluded its discussion of the summary judgment law as
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Union Bank v. Superior Court... was the first reported
decision that addressed the 1992 and 1993 amendments to
section 437c, which now appear as subsections (1) and (2) of
subdivision (o). The opinion of the court in Union Bank
makes it amply clear that the intent of the legislature in 1992
and 1993 was to replace the rule of Barnes with a more
balanced rule.
Before addressing the facts of the case before it, the court
in Union Bank noted the state of the law prior to the 1992
and 1993 amendments. After reviewing Barnes v. Blue
Haven Pools"' and its progeny, the court of appeals turned to
the 1992 and 1993 amendments which it concluded
"legislatively overruled" Barnes."5  The court examined the
legislative history of the 1992 and 1993 amendments at
length"6 and concluded that the amendments overruled
Barnes "insofar as it prohibited a summary judgment motion
from being granted when a moving defendant merely relies on
a plaintiffs factually devoid interrogatory answers."117 The
court recognized that "there may be other aspects of the
legislatively intended changes resulting from the 1992 and
1993 amendments to section 437c" but limited itself to
holding that Barnes was no longer the law."8
But the court in Union Bank did not ignore the broader
follows: "The sponsor points to the federal rules as providing a more
equitable standard. Under Federal Rule 56, a party moving for
summary judgment is not required to support the motion with
affidavits or other similar materials to negate an opponent's claim.
(See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 317 [91 L.Ed.2d 265,
106 S.Ct. 2548].) This bill would follow the federal example and
require each party seeking a summary judgment to prove up its own
case without having to negate claims of the opposition." (See Sen. Com.
on Jud. Com. Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2616, supra, at p. 9.) When
Assembly Bill No. 2616 was returned to the lower house for
concurrence in Senate amendments, a report prepared by the Assembly
Committee of the Floor Coordinator stated, somewhat ambiguously:
"Clarifies the burden of proof on summary adjudication and summary
judgment motions to codify state law as to the defendant's burden of
proof and changes the plaintiffs burden of proof in accordance with the
United States Supreme Court's decision of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
(1986) 477 U.S. 317 [91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548] .... "
Id. at 660-61 (internal citations omitted).
113. Id.
114. 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1969).
115. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658-59.
116. See id. at 662-64.
117. Id. at 664.
118. Id. at 664-65.
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implications of overruling Barnes."9 As the court's discussion
of the legislative history of the 1992 and 1993 amendments
shows, Union Bank recognized the objectives of the
legislature which extended beyond empowering a defendant
to refer to a plaintiffs discovery responses in a motion for
summary judgment. The legislative history shows that the
intent of the legislature was to relieve parties moving for
summary judgment of the burden of "negating" the claims of
the opponent and to at least approach the federal standard,
which was seen as more equitable. 2 °
Union Bank also took careful and repeated note of
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,"' both as to its holding and
interpretation in federal practice.2 ' But, possibly out of a
sense of judicial restraint, the Union Bank decision
purposefully limited itself to holding that the effect of the
1992 and 1993 amendments was to allow the defendant to
rely on the discovery responses of the plaintiff to shift to the
plaintiff the burden of showing that there were triable issues
of material fact, although the effect of subdivision (o) is much
broader than this.
As the Union Bank decision showed, the focus of the
legislature's concern was the relatively onerous burden
imposed by Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools on the party moving
for summary judgment. But the burden is only unfairly
onerous when the moving party does not bear the burdens of
proof or production. Since, as a general matter, it is usually
plaintiffs and not defendants who bear the burdens of proof
and production, 24 the legislature decided that plaintiffs and
119. Barnes had held that the defendant had to negate the plaintiffs case and
that the defendant had that burden even if the plaintiffs evidence was so
insufficient as to lead to a nonsuit or directed verdict against the plaintiff, if
such a motion would be brought at trial against the same evidence. In other
words, the broad holding of Barnes was that the defendant bore the production
burden simply by virtue of making a motion for summary judgment. See
Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447. Overruling Barnes also meant that this broader
rule was abrogated.
120. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660-63.
121. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
122. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661 n.7, 665.
123. See id. at 664-65.
124. The plaintiff has the production burden on the elements of his or her
causes of action since a party has the burden of proof as to each fact that is
essential to its claim - and the burden of producing evidence as to a particular
fact is initially on the party with the burden of proof. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§
500, 550(b) (West 2000). While the defendant is in all likelihood going to have
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defendants moving for summary judgment should be treated
differently. Thus, plaintiffs and cross-complainants, and
defendants and cross-defendants are dealt with, respectively
and separately, in subsections (1) and (2) of subdivision (o).
That it is generally the plaintiff who will bear the
burdens of proof and production is reflected in the
distinctions between the tasks facing plaintiffs and
defendants, respectively, under subsections (1) and (2) of
subdivision (o).
In order to prevail in the action, the plaintiff, who bears
the burdens of proof and production, should meet both
burdens. If the plaintiff meets the burden of production, the
plaintiff gets to the jury. If the plaintiff meets the burden of
proof, he or she is entitled to judgment. But the burden of
proof is not at issue on a motion for summary judgment.'
How then can a plaintiff show on a motion for summary
judgment that he or she is entitled to judgment?
If the party with the production burden produces
"evidence of such overwhelming probative force that no
person could reasonably disbelieve it in the absence of
countervailing evidence," that party is certainly entitled to
judgment unless, of course, the opponent does propound
countervailing evidence. It is also true that when a party has
produced "evidence of such overwhelming probative force
that no person could reasonably disbelieve it in the absence of
countervailing evidence," it has produced enough evidence to
shift the burden of production.'26 Putting it another way,
when the party with the production burden produces evidence
of such probative force that a determination in its favor is
required in the absence of countervailing evidence, the
production burden shifts to the opponent.2 ' Once the burden
has shifted, the proponent is entitled to judgment, unless the
opponent produces countervailing evidence.'
Subsection (1) of subdivision (o) of section 437c describes
the burden of proof and the burden of production on affirmative defenses, the
plaintiff will bear both burdens on the causes of action asserted in the
complaint. See ROBERT I. WEIL & IRA A. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 10:247 (The Rutter Group 2000).
125. See discussion supra Part I.C.
126. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 550 and Law Revision Commission Comment of
1965.
127. See id.
128. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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a situation where the plaintiff has made a showing sufficient
to shift the production burden to the opponent, i.e., the
defendant.
Under subsection (1) of subdivision (o) of section 437c, the
plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her "burden" of
showing that there is no defense to the action if "that party
has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the
party to judgment on that cause of action."'29 Thus, under
subsection (1) of subdivision (o), a plaintiff moving for
summary judgment must produce evidence of such probative
force as to shift the production burden to the defendant before
summary judgment can be granted. This means that the
plaintiffs showing must be probative enough to exclude the
possibility that a rational finder of fact could return a verdict
for the defendant.
This makes a good deal of sense. If the plaintiff with the
production burden and the burden of proof does nothing more
than to propound evidence that is sufficient, one cannot
award judgment for the plaintiff.' Sufficient evidence on the
part of the plaintiff does not exclude the possibility that the
defendant has evidence that contradicts the plaintiffs
evidence. Awarding judgment to the plaintiff who has shown
nothing more than that it has sufficient evidence would give
the plaintiff prior to trial what it would not have at trial. It
would award judgment in the plaintiffs favor without the
plaintiff having shown that it has evidence of such probative
force as will entitle it to judgment. Therefore, under
subsection (1) of subdivision (o), the party with the burden of
proof and the burden of production at trial - the plaintiff -
must produce evidence sufficient to shift the burden of
production. This is evidence of such weight as would entitle
the plaintiff to judgment unless it is controverted.
Motions for summary judgment by parties who bear the
burdens of production and proof, usually plaintiffs, have not
presented the difficulties that are inherent in motions made
by parties who do not bear these burdens. Indeed, the rules
laid down in subsection (1) of subdivision (o) can be found in a
case decided fifty-five years before the legislature enacted the
129. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
130. See supra Part I.C. Sufficient evidence means either direct evidence or,
if the evidence is circumstantial, an inference that is more probable or
reasonable than the conflicting inference.
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first version of subdivision (o) in 1992.' Since that early
decision, an occasional appellate decision 3 2 or law review
article33 has recognized that a plaintiff moving for summary
judgment, i.e., a party who bears the burdens of proof and
production, must produce such evidence as will support a
judgment in its favor. Thus, it is not too much to say that
subsection (1) of subdivision (o) was declarative of existing
law when the legislature enacted it.
The legislature's treatment of a plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment, when the moving party will in all
likelihood have the production burden at trial, is obviously
generic and not limited to the narrow setting of any single
case like Barnes.34
The legislature also affords generic treatment to
defendants' motions for summary judgment. Here, however,
the situation is different because a defendant is likely to be
making a motion for summary judgment against the party
who has the production burden at trial. It is the plaintiff and
not the defendant who has the burden to produce evidence on
131. In Gardenschwartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 68 P.2d 322 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1937), the plaintiff sued in municipal court on three policies insuring
him against total and permanent disability. The defendant's answer denied
that plaintiff was disabled and denied that he had proven his disability, as he
was required to do under the policies. See id. at 326. The plaintiff moved for
summary judgment. The defendant filed affidavits in opposition but the motion
was granted. The defendant appealed. The appellate department of the
superior court concluded that the defendant's affidavits were "insufficient to
defeat the motion" because they were based on incompetent and inadmissible
evidence. See id. at 324-25. However, it turned out that the plaintiffs
affidavits did not contain "evidentiary facts sufficient to show a cause of action"
but were merely conclusions of law. See id. at 326. The plaintiff clearly had the
burdens of proof and production on the proposition that he had become disabled.
See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 500, 550. As the moving party with the burdens of
proof and production, he had to demonstrate that he had met the burden of
production and that, absent a contrary showing by the defendant, he was
entitled to judgment. Or, as subsection (1) of subdivision (o) of section 437c
would put it, fifty-five years later, the plaintiff had to "prove" each element of
the cause of action "entitling [the plaintiffi to judgment." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 437c(o)(1). Since the plaintiff, and moving party, in Gardenschwartz had
failed to meet that burden, his motion for summary judgment had to be denied.
See Gardenschwartz, 68 P.2d at 326.
132. See, e.g., Snider v. Snider, 19 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713-14 (Ct. App. 1962).
133. See, eg., Pollack, supra note 100, at 424-25.
134. Barnes involved a defendant's motion for summary judgment in a case
where the plaintiff had the production burden at trial. See Barnes v. Blue
Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969). Subsection (1) of subdivision (o)
addresses motions for summary judgment by plaintiffs who will generally have
the production burden. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1).
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the merits of its cause or causes of action."'
Subsection (2) of subdivision (o) provides that the
defendant has met his or her burden of showing that the
action has no merit if that party "shows" that one or more
elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that
there is a complete defense to the cause of action.
The question is whether the defendant's "burden" in
moving for summary judgment on the grounds that one or
more elements of the cause of action cannot be established
must be of a probative force sufficient to shift the production
burden.
The answer to this question begins with the observation
that under California law the party moving for summary
judgment must set forth in a "separate statement" all the
material facts that the moving party contends are
undisputed"6 and must support each of these material facts
with a reference to the evidence. '37  This important
requirement is discussed separately below.' Whatever the
answer to the foregoing question is, it is certain that the
party moving for summary judgment must propound evidence
in support of the motion.
Any evidence will not do. The evidence submitted in
support of the motion must support a "material" fact claimed
to be undisputed139 and it must be admissible evidence. 4 °
Returning to the question of whether a party who does
not otherwise bear the burdens of proof and production must
produce evidence sufficient to shift the production burden, the
answer is an emphatic "no." If the defendant must produce
evidence that shifts the production burden, i.e., prove that the
plaintiff has no evidence with an evidentiary showing
sufficiently strong to entitle the defendant to judgment, then
Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools has been resurrected and the
1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c are a nullity.
135. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (indicating that the plaintiff has the
production burden on the elements of his or her causes of action since a party
has the burden of proof as to each fact that is essential to its claim); see also
CAL. EVID. CODE § 550 (the production burden follows the burden of proof).
136. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c(b).
137. See id
138. See discussion infra Part I.F.
139. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c(b).
140. See id. § 437c(d); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Fish, 333 P.2d 133 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958); Kramer v. Barnes, 27 Cal. Rptr. 895, 898-99 (Ct. App. 1963);
Hayman v. Block, 222 Cal. Rptr. 293, 298-99 (Ct. App. 1986).
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This, of course, is not what the legislature intended.
On the other side of the spectrum, it cannot be that the
defendant can propound evidence that is less than sufficient,
such as circumstantial evidence, where the inference on
which the defendant relies is less probable than the
conflicting inference."' This follows when one considers what
would happen if the opponent of the motion would challenge
the moving party's insufficient evidence with a motion of its
own, whether by summary judgment or a motion for directed
verdict. The court would have to grant such a motion.
Entering judgment in favor of a party whose case is factually
so deficient as to be vulnerable to summary judgment or
directed verdict is bad law and bad policy. Thus, it is hardly
logical to permit a moving party who otherwise does not bear
the burdens of proof and production to propound evidence
that is insufficient,
Since the evidence propounded by a moving party who
does not bear the burdens of proof and production must be
less than that required to shift the burden of production and
more than evidence that is insufficient, it appears that the
evidence that supports the motion must be sufficient. That is,
the moving party without the burdens of proof and production
must produce either direct evidence or, in the case of
circumstantial evidence, the inference propounded must be
more probable than the conflicting inference.
A textual analysis of subsections (1) and (2) of
subdivision (o) demonstrates that the foregoing deduction is
sound. First, subsections (1) and (2) differ in that the former
provides that the plaintiff must prove each element of the
cause of action sufficient to "entitl[e] the [plaintiffl to
judgment" while the latter does not impose this condition on
the defendant's showing that there is no merit to the cause of
action. Putting it another way, while under subsection (1) the
plaintiff must show that it is entitled to judgment, under
subsection (2) the defendant must show that one or more
elements of the plaintiffs case "cannot be established." The
defendant need not disprove every element of the plaintiffs
case. In other words, the defendant does not have to "negate"
the plaintiffs case.
Second, while under subsection (1) the plaintiff must
141. Direct evidence of a proposition is sufficient evidence. See discussion
supra Part I.C.
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"prove" each element of its cause of action, under subsection
(2) the defendant need only "show" that the cause of action
has no merit. "Show" connotes a lesser burden than "prove."
In fact, Barnes and its progeny spoke of the defendant's
burden to "prove" that the opponent was unable to establish
one or more elements of its case. The choice of a less
exacting or at least a different term to describe the obligation
of the defendant is a further indication that the legislature
intended to differentiate between the burdens of the party
who normally has the production burden, i.e., the plaintiff,
and the defendant.
This analysis of subsections (1) and (2) of subdivision (o)
is supported by the fact that if the legislature did not intend
to relieve the defendant of the duty to shift the burden of
production when the plaintiff has that burden, then Barnes
has not been overruled and the 1992 and 1993 amendments
to section 437c would be meaningless. Yet, as the court of
appeals demonstrated convincingly in Union Bank v. Superior
Court,'43 the very objective of these two amendments was to
overrule Barnes.4 It was Barnes that had required the party
without the production burden to assume the burden of
disproving or negating the plaintiffs claim and had imposed
no burden whatsoever on the plaintiff until the defendant had
succeeded in doing so - even though the plaintiff would have
that burden at trial and even though the plaintiffs opposition
to the motion for summary judgment showed that the
plaintiff could not meet that burden.'45 It was this anomaly
that the legislature intended to remove by enacting the 1992
amendment to section 437c.
The "burden" referred to in subsection (2) of subdivision
(o) that is imposed on the defendant is therefore met by the
presentation of sufficient evidence, either direct evidence or, if
circumstantial, by an inference or inferences that are more
probable than the conflicting inferences. 46
Difficulties arise when the moving party seeks to prove a
negative by circumstantial evidence, that is, that the
opponent has no evidence on one or more issues that are
142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
143. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
144. See id. at 660-64.
145. See discussion supra Part I.D.
146. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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material to its case. The moving party in such cases takes
what some courts have dubbed the "no evidence approach."'47
But whatever the "approach," it must rest on evidence that is
sufficient.
In cases involving the "no evidence" approach, the
moving party usually relies on circumstantial evidence from
which it seeks to draw the inference that the opponent has no
evidence. This circumstantial evidence is almost always
based on evidentiary facts'48 composed of discovery requests
propounded by the moving party and the nonmovant's
responses thereto.'49 The inference that the moving party
seeks to draw from these evidentiary facts is that the
nonmovant has no evidence on a given issue or issues.
Of course, nothing prohibits the moving party from
producing evidence probative enough to justify a judgment in
its favor, i.e., from making a showing sufficiently strong to
meet the old test under Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools.5' Some
courts have referred to this as the "tried and true technique"
of showing that an essential element of the plaintiffs case
cannot be established. 5'
If the "burden" referred to in subsection (2) of subdivision
(o) is not the production burden, then what is it that "shifts"
under this provision? The statute provides the answer. If the
defendant and moving party (without the production burden)
has "shown" that one or more elements of the cause of action
cannot be established, the burden "to show that a triable
issue of one or more material facts exists"' shifts to the party
with the production burden. However, it is not the production
burden that has shifted. The production burden has been on
the plaintiff all along. After the movant has "shown" that one
or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established,
what has shifted is the burden to show that a triable issue of
147. See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct. App.
2000), review granted and opinion superceded by 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441 (Ct. App.
2000).
148. See People v. Goldstein, 293 P.2d 495, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
149. See, e.g., Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653; Villa v. McFerren, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 719 (Ct. App. 1995); Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr.
2d 360 (Ct. App. 1999).
150. 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
151. See Brantley v. Pisaro, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674, 679 (Ct. App.
1992)); see also Aguilar, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351.
152. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(2) (West 2000).
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material fact exists.
Where the defendant's motion for summary judgment is
based on the contention that the action has no merit because
there is a complete defense to the action,153 it is very likely
that the defendant has the burdens of proof and production
on the defense. There is at least one post-1992 appellate
decision where this was the case."' In such cases, the moving
defendant must produce evidence that shifts the production
burden, just as in the instance of a plaintiff with the burdens
of proof and production.
Subdivision (o) as it reads now does not make allowance
for a defendant's motion for summary judgment when, as in
the instance of an affirmative defense, the defendant bears
the burdens of proof and production. Assembly Bill No. 843,'
which did not pass, would have expressly recognized that the
"moving party" would not have to "negate" the elements of a
cause of action or defense "on which the nonmoving party
bears the burden of proof."156 This would have predicated
subdivision (o) directly on the allocation of the burdens of
proof and production, rather than more indirectly on the
position the party occupies in the litigation. Federal law
speaks more directly to this issue, as did Assembly Bill No.
843.57
Assembly Bill No. 843 would have been a step in the
right direction. While the distinction between plaintiffs and
defendants made by subdivision (o) is generally workable
because the burdens of proof and production usually fall to
the former and not the latter, the actual distinction is
between parties who bear the burdens of proof and production
153. See id.
154. See discussion infra Part I.F.6; see also Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 197 (Ct. App. 1995).
155. A.B. 843, 149th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
156. Lloyd's of London, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821, 823 (Ct. App. 1997).
157. See, e.g., Edison v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 664 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that an insurer who brings a declaratory judgment claim must
demonstrate no realistic possibility that the fact finder will find policy language
at issue); see also United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A. v. Gagel, 815 F. Supp.
387, 391 (D. Kan. 1993) (indicating that a movant with the burden of
persuasion must make a prima facie case of each essential element of its claim,
as well as negating any affirmative defenses of the nonmovant, in order to
obtain summary judgment); 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 56.1.31] (if
movant bears the burden of persuasion, he must show that the record contains
evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so
powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it).
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and parties who do not bear these burdens.
E. The Impact of Subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 437c on
the 1992 and 1993 Amendments
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 437c have an important
impact on the operation of subdivision (o)."' Subdivision (b)
158. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c(b)-(c) (West 2000):
(b) The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of
which judicial notice shall or may be taken. The supporting papers
shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and
concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are
undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a
reference to the supporting evidence. The failure to comply with this
requirement of a separate statement may in the court's discretion
constitute a sufficient ground for denial of the motion. Any
opposition to the motion shall be served and filed not less than 14
days preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause orders otherwise. The opposition, where
appropriate, shall consist of affidavits, declarations, admissions,
answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which
judicial notice shall or may be taken. The opposition papers shall
include a separate statement which responds to each of the material
facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating
whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are
undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely
any other material facts which the opposing party contends are
disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be
disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.
Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement
may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court's discretion, for
granting the motion. Any reply to the opposition shall be served and
filed by the moving party not less than five days preceding the
noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
orders otherwise. Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing
shall be deemed waived. Sections 1005 and 1013, extending the
time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done,
do not apply to this section. Any incorporation by reference of
matter in the court's file shall set forth with specificity the exact
matter to which reference is being made and shall not incorporate
the entire file.
(c) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. In determining whether the papers show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact the court shall consider all
of the evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which
objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary
judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other
inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any material
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and (c) set forth the requirements of a motion for summary
judgment and of the opposition to the motion. These
requirements directly affect what is meant by the term
"burden" in subdivision (o).19
The fundamental requirement imposed by subdivisions
(b) and (c) is that a motion for summary judgment must be
made, opposed, and decided in terms of evidence. Neither
party can meet its burden without a reference to the
evidence.16° And it is no mystery what evidence is. Evidence
is "testimony, writings, material objects, or other things
presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence
or nonexistence of a fact."
16
"The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all
the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."6 ' In determining whether the
papers show that there is a triable issue as to any material
fact, the court is required to consider all the evidence,
including inferences that are reasonably deducible from the
evidence."' "All the evidence" is the evidence that is found in
the submissions of the party moving for summary judgment
and the party opposing the motion.
Furthermore, the evidence in support of a motion for
summary judgment must be filed in a separate statement 64
and an opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be
made in response thereto. The motion must set forth all the
material facts that the moving party contends are
undisputed'65 and "each of the material facts stated shall be
followed by a reference to the supporting evidence."66 On the
other hand, the opposition's response must indicate whether
the opponent agrees or disagrees that the facts are
fact.
Id.
159. See supra note 20 (reprinting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)).
160. There are cases where there are no triable issues as to any material fact
but where questions of law need to be decided before judgment can be entered.
But even in these cases the moving party has to submit a statement of
undisputed facts that is supported by evidence.
161. CAL. EVID. CODE § 140 (West 2000).
162. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(c).
163. See id.
164. See id. § 437c(b).
165. See id.
166. Id.
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undisputed.'67 If the opponent contends that the fact is
disputed, the opponent must support that with a reference to
supporting evidence.' The opponent is also required to set
forth any other material facts that the opponent contends are
disputed and these material facts must also be supported by a
reference to the supporting evidence.9
Some appellate courts have held that even after the 1992
and 1993 amendments to section 437c it is not enough to
simply "suggest the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove
its case" 7' and that merely arguing that the nonmovant has
no evidence is not enough.171 Subdivision (b) requires the
party moving for summary judgment to set forth "plainly and
concisely all material facts which the moving party contends
are undisputed." 2  An argument or contention by the
defendant that the plaintiff has no evidence to support an
element of its cause of action is not a fact, it is an argument.
Thus, if subdivision (b) is observed and enforced, the
defendant will have to state the particular element of the
plaintiffs case that is unsupported by evidence in the
negative and as a fact. As an example, if the defendant
claims that the plaintiff has no evidence that the defendant
caused the plaintiffs injuries, the defendant must propound
as an undisputed material fact that the defendant did not
cause the injury. Having done so, the defendant must then
support this assertion with references to the evidence.
The evidence presented in a motion for summary
judgment may be direct or circumstantial. But whether
direct or circumstantial, it must be evidence.'7' The evidence
must support the fact claimed to be undisputed.' 4 Settled
rules governing direct and circumstantial evidence provide
guidance on when the evidence that supports the asserted
undisputed fact is sufficient.
167. See id.
168. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c.
169. See id.
170. Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 207-08 (Ct. App. 1995); see
also Addy v. Bliss & Glennon, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 647-48 (Ct. App. 1996).
171. See Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 372-73 (Ct.
App. 1999).
172. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c (emphasis added).
173. See id. § 437c(b).
174. See id.
175. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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F. The Effects of the 1992 and 1993 Amendments to Section
437c
The courts of appeals were quick to recognize the changes
that the 1992 and 1993 amendments brought to motions for
summary judgment in California. Union Bank7 led the way
with a thorough and convincing opinion that found, by
enacting the 1992 and 1993 amendments, the legislature
intended to overrule Barnes.'
The demise of Barnes raised a number of problems that
have been addressed and in part resolved by the courts of
appeal. However, some of these resolutions are less than
ideal if not erroneous. Yet, these errors are easy to rectify
once they have been identified.
There are six areas of concern. First, some courts have
suggested that once the party moving for summary judgment
has met its burden, it is the "burden of proof' that shifts to
the nonmovant."8 However, it is not the burden of proof or
the burden of production that shifts to the nonmovant."9
Under the terms of the statute, the burden that shifts is the
burden "to show that a triable issue of one or more material
facts exists."8 ° This burden is met by either producing direct
evidence or, in the instance of circumstantial evidence, by an
inference or inferences that are more probable or reasonable
than conflicting inferences - in other words, by sufficient
evidence.'
Second, there is the question of whether it is enough for
the party moving for summary judgment to limit itself to the
argument that the opponent's case is not supported by any
evidence or whether the party moving for summary judgment
must support the motion with some evidentiary showing. The
question arises because the 1992 and 1993 amendments were
at least influenced by federal practice, if not sparked by it.'82
Under federal practice, the moving party need not support
the summary judgment motion with evidence, if the moving
176. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
177. 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
178. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663-64; see also Chaknova v.
Wilbur-Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 878 (Ct. App. 1999).
179. See discussion supra Part I.C.
180. See discussion infra Part I.F.
181. See discussion supra Part I.C.
182. See discussion supra Part I.E.
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party does not bear the burdens of proof and production.183
Although this caused some debate among the courts of
appeals,8 the disagreement is more apparent than real. Not
even the opinion that supposedly came closest to the federal
rule actually endorsed it.'85 California's requirement that the
moving party support the facts claimed to be undisputed with
evidence86 excludes the federal rule or any rule that would
make it possible for the party moving for summary judgment
to make the motion without evidentiary support.
Third, central to the abolition of the rule of Barnes that
the production burden is re-allocated to the party moving for
summary judgment even if the opponent of the motion has
that burden at trial, is the recognition that for the purposes of
the summary judgment motion the burden of production
remains with the party who has it at trial. The appellate
courts have endorsed this important principle.'87
Fourth, the demise of the rule of Barnes means that
motions may be made against the party that has the
production burden. But if in such cases the moving party
does not need to produce enough evidence to satisfy the
production burden, it becomes unclear as to how much
evidence the moving party must produce. The courts have
supplied the answer to this question, by holding that the
moving party must produce evidence that is sufficient. If the
moving party bases its motion on direct evidence, the
evidence will be sufficient since such evidence is sufficient to
establish a fact.'88 On the other hand, if the motion is based
on circumstantial evidence, the inference that the moving
party seeks to draw must be more probable or reasonable
than the conflicting inference.'89
Fifth, in responding to the question of how much
evidence a party must propound when it is making a motion
for summary judgment against the party with the burden of
production, some courts have answered this question by
edging perilously close to a standard that would have
183. See supra note 2; see also discussion supra Part I.E.
184. See discussion infra Part I.F.2.
185. See Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App.
1995).
186. See discussion supra Part I.F; see also discussion infra Part I.F.2.
187. See discussion infra Part I.F.3.
188. See discussion supra Part I.C; see also discussion infra Part I.F.4.
189. See discussion infra Part I.F.4.
[Vol. 41
2000] MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 73
satisfied Barnes.' This is neither a necessary nor a welcome
development.'
Sixth, when the motion for summary judgment is made
by the party who has the burdens of proof and production at
trial, the moving party's evidence must be of such probative
weight that it entitles the moving party to judgment, unless
the opponent can produce conflicting evidence.19 Similarly,
this applies when defendants move for summary judgment on
issues on which they have the burdens of proof and
production. Although the statute does not recognize this
principle, one appellate decision handed down after 1993
supports this principle.193
1. When the Motion for Summary Judgment is Made
Against the Party with the Production Burden, the
Motion Must Shift the Burden of Showing That
Triable Issues of Material Facts Exist. The Motion
Does Not Shift the Burden of Proof
Union Bank v. Superior Court9 4 was a pathbreaking
decision that steered the courts toward the recognition that
the reason for the enactment of the 1992 amendments was to
set aside the rule of Barnes. Union Bank was also a decision
that without a doubt reached the correct result.
However, one error crept into the decision that is more of
a verbal than a conceptual mistake. The error was the
conclusion that "[a] moving defendant may rely on factually
devoid discovery responses [of the nonmovant] to shift the
burden of proof pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (o)(2)."19'
The burden that shifts is not the burden of proof, nor the
burden of production. 9 ' The burden that shifts is the burden
to show that triable issues of material fact exist.
A review of the Union Bank decision shows how this
terminological error crept into the court's decision and that it
can be eliminated in future cases without disturbing the
reasoning and the result of this decision.
190. See discussion infra Part I.F.5.
191. See discussion infra Part I.F.5.
192. See discussion infra Part I.F.6.
193. See Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Ct. App. 1995); see
also discussion infra Part I.F.6.
194. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
195. Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added).
196. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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The plaintiffs in Union Bank were investors who had
leased a medical scanner from one of the defendants and
assigned to Union Bank as security for the lease the assets of
NMR Investors Fund I that gave the bank the right to
repossess the scanner in the event of a default.'97 The
plaintiffs defaulted and Union Bank repossessed the
scanner.9 The plaintiffs sued several defendants, including
Union Bank, contending that the defendants had defrauded
and conspired to defraud the plaintiffs.'99 The complaint
alleged that Union Bank had "participated" in the acts of the
defendants. °°
When served with requests for admission by Union Bank,
the plaintiffs refused to admit that the bank had not
committed fraud and also refused to admit that the bank had
not conspired to commit fraud. 0' When asked by follow-up
interrogatories to explain the bases for these denials, the
plaintiffs responded that Union Bank had "knowingly and
fraudulently" taken the assignments of NMR Investors Fund
I's assets to secure the loan.2"2 Plaintiffs also "reserved the
right" to respond further to the interrogatory.0 3 However, the
plaintiffs' answers contained no facts upon which these
allegations might have been based. On the contrary,
plaintiffs admitted that Union Bank had not taken
inappropriate action "[iin connection with its [Union Bank's]
role in the transactions ... in plaintiffs investment in NMR
Investor's Fund I.,,204
The plaintiffs had the burden of production when it came
to showing that Union Bank had committed fraud and had
conspired to commit fraud. Proving fraud was a fact
"essential to [the plaintiffs'] claim" which placed the burden of
proof on the plaintiffs as well.20 5 That is, Union Bank's
motion was made against the party with both the burden of
production and the burden of proof.
197. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655.
204. Id. at 658.
205. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 2000) (stating that "a party has the
burden of proof as to each fact the existence of which is essential to its claim").
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Union Bank's motion for summary judgment had
evidently set forth as material undisputed facts that the bank
had "[n]either made any fraudulent representations nor was
it a member of a conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs.""6
Furthermore, Union Bank propounded its requests for
discovery and the plaintiffs' discovery responses as the
evidence that supported these allegedly material undisputed
facts. Although the Union Bank court did not remark upon
it, Union Bank's motion for summary judgment complied with
subdivision (b) of section 437c because it was based on
evidence that supported the facts claimed to be undisputed. 8
The evidence, although circumstantial, supported the fact
that the bank had not defrauded the plaintiffs and had not
participated in a conspiracy. Union Bank had requested the
plaintiffs to admit that the bank had not defrauded them and
that it had not been a member of a conspiracy.0 9 Since the
plaintiffs refused to do so, they had to respond to discovery
requests that asked them to "state all facts," provide the
identities of witnesses, and identify the documents that
supported the plaintiffs' response.210 But the plaintiffs had
not furnished any evidence and had not identified any
witnesses or documents to support their denials of fraud and
conspiracy." They had only stated that they "believed" that
the bank had defrauded them and conspired against them.212
Barring an admission, evidence that plaintiffs had been
asked for facts but had supplied none is circumstantial
evidence that supported the reasonable inference that they
had no facts. This circumstantial evidence therefore
supported the facts claimed to be undisputed, that is, that the
bank had not committed fraud and had not participated in a
conspiracy. 13 Given that, when asked, the plaintiffs had not
206. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655.
207. See id.
208. "Each of the material facts [claimed to be undisputed] shall be followed
by a reference to the supporting evidence." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West
2000).
209. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. If the case had gone to trial and the plaintiffs rested their case against
Union Bank with no more evidence than they disclosed in their discovery
responses, a motion for directed verdict by Union Bank would clearly have been
granted.
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produced any evidence that the bank had committed fraud, it
was more probable than not that there was no evidence of
fraud.214 This was probative circumstantial evidence.215
Thus, Union Bank had done all that it was required to do
by subdivision (b) of section 437c. It had stated material facts
that it claimed were undisputed and had supported those
facts with references to the evidence that turned out to be
probative circumstantial evidence. The facts claimed to be
undisputed were clearly material and the evidence
propounded did support those facts.
Everything had been done that needed to be done to shift
to the plaintiff the burden to show that a triable issue of one
or more material facts existed. Under subdivision (o) of
section 437c, the undisputed facts and the evidence that
supported those facts "showed" that the plaintiffs' action had
no merit in that one or more elements thereof could not be
established.
However, at this point the court of appeals took one step
in the wrong direction. The court concluded that "a moving
defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery responses
[of the nonmovant] to shift the burden of proof pursuant to
section 437c, subdivision (o)(2)." 16 Subdivision (o)(2) of
section 437c does not refer to "shifting" the burden of proof."7
Subdivision (o)(2) provides that a defendant or cross-
defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause
of action has no merit if "that party has shown that one or
more elements of the cause of action.., cannot be established
or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action." "'
This provision does not assign to the defendant or cross-
defendant the burden of proof. The only burden that is
assigned to the defendant or cross-defendant is the "burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit.""9 The "burden
of showing that a cause of action has no merit" can be neither
the burden of proof nor can it be the burden of production. It
214. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.
215. See discussion supra Part I.C.
216. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 (emphasis added).
217. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(2) (West 2000).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id. (emphasis added). The defendant or cross-defendant can accomplish
this by showing "[he] has shown that one or more elements of the cause of
action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a
complete defense to that cause of action." Id.
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is not the former because "'[biurden of proof means the
obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite
degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of
fact or the court."22' Establishing the requisite degree of belief
concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact is definitely
not at issue in a motion for summary judgment. And the
"burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit"
cannot be a reference to the burden of production. If it were,
the whole point of subdivision (o)(2), which was to overrule
Barnes, would be frustrated.
The "burden of showing that a cause of action has no
merit" is just that and nothing more. Compliance with
subdivision (b) of section 437c is achieved by drafting a
"separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all
material facts which the moving party contends are
undisputed"221 wherein "[e]ach of the material facts stated [is]
followed by a reference to the supporting evidence."2 2 This
evidence must be either direct evidence or, if circumstantial,
the inference relied upon must be more probable than the
conflicting inference. 3 In short, the evidence must be legally
sufficient. 4
Once Union Bank had supported its claim that it was
undisputed that it had not committed fraud or participated in
a conspiracy with references to the evidence, the "burden"
that "shifted" was the burden to show that "a triable issue of
one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action.""'
Although the plaintiffs in Union Bank did respond to the
bank's statement of undisputed facts, the court of appeals
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to supply "substantial
evidence of deceit on defendant's part or its participation in a
fraudulent conspiracy."26 However, the problem was that the
"burden of proof' in Union Bank, assuming that the reference
was to the burden of producing evidence, did not have to be
220. CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 2000).
221. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b).
222. Id.
223. See discussion supra Parts I.C, I.F.
224. See discussion supra Part I.C.
225. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(2) (emphasis added). "Once the
defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto." Id. (emphasis
added).
226. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657.
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"shifted." It remained all along where it began and belonged,
with the plaintiffs.
The court in Union Bank may have devised the construct
of "shifting" the "burden of proof' in an effort to define the
standard, which the party moving for summary judgment
must meet in order to require the opponent to respond to the
motion. But the statute itself sets forth that standard in
clear and pragmatic terms.227 There is no need to create a
"triggering" event.
Union Bank's reference to the shifting of the "burden of
proof' has been echoed in subsequent decisions.228 However,
other cases properly refer to the "burden" that "shifts" as a
burden to show that triable issues of material fact exist.
229
The latter conforms to the statute and is the proper
articulation of the rule.
2. An Evidentiary Showing is Required to Support a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
In federal law and practice, the party moving for
summary judgment need not support the motion with an
evidentiary showing."' The same is not true of California
summary judgment. Subdivision (b) of section 437c requires
that the party moving for summary judgment support the
facts claimed to be undisputed with references to the
evidence.23" ' California law precludes a motion for summary
judgment that is not supported by such evidence. Hagen v.
Hickenbottom232 and Addy v. Bliss & Glennon33 criticized
227. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 437c(b), (o)(2).
228. See, eg., Chaknova v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 878 (Ct.
App. 1999).
229. See, e.g., Smith v. Maldonado, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 401 (Ct. App. 1999).
230. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2727; 11 MOORE ET AL., supra
note 16, § 56.13[1].
231. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b).
232. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 209 (Ct. App. 1995).
233. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Ct. App. 1996).
We went on to say, however, that we disagreed "with those [such as the
court in Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th
1282, 1287-1289 (44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35)] who may be understood to
suggest that a moving defendant may shift the burden simply by
suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case. It is
clear to us, from the requirement of the 1992 amendment that a
defendant have 'shown that one or more elements of the cause of
action... cannot be established' (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, former subd.
(n)(2), Stats. 1992, ch. 1348, § 1), that a defendant must make an
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Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp.234 for suggesting that,
after 1992, it is enough for the moving party to simply argue,
on the federal model, that the nonmovant's case was not
supported by evidence. However, a review of Hunter shows
this criticism to be unfounded.
In Hunter, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants for
injuries arising from exposure to asbestos. One of those
defendants, Pacific Mechanical Corporation (PMC), moved for
summary judgment. It appears that the motion for summary
judgment complied with subdivision (b) of section 437c. The
fact claimed by the defendant to be undisputed was that PMC
had not caused Hunter's injuries. As required,235  the
defendant supported this fact with evidence from Hunter's
deposition testimony that Hunter was "not familiar" with
PMC and that he could not recall ever working in the same
area with PMC employees.236 The inference that PMC sought
to draw from these evidentiary facts was that PMC had not
caused Hunter's injuries. It appears that the evidence that
the moving party propounded supported the fact that PMC
did not cause Hunter's injuries. That is, at least minimally,
affirmative showing in support of his or her motion. Such a showing
connotes something significantly more than simply 'pointing out to
the ... court' that 'there is an absence of evidence': before the burden of
producing even a prima facie case should be shifted to the plaintiff in
advance of trial, a defendant who cannot negate an element of the
plaintiffs case should be required to produce direct or circumstantial
evidence that the plaintiff not only does not have but cannot reasonably
expect to obtain a prima facie case. But where such a showing can be
made we consider it both fair to the defendant and consistent with
efficient administration of justice that the plaintiff be called upon, on
risk of summary judgment, to make a prima facie case." (Hagen v.
Hickenbottom, supra, 41 Cal. App. 4th at p. 186.)
Id. at 647-48.
234. 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995).
235. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b).
236. The court said,
[Iln support of its motion, PMC principally relied on Hunter's
deposition testimony that he was not familiar with PMC and that he
could not recall ever working in the same area with PMC employees.
PMC argued that Hunter had made a factually unsupported claim
because "there is no evidence that PMC was even at the same job sites
as plaintiff. If PMC was not at the same job site, let alone right next to
plaintiff at the same job site, it could not have been responsible for
plaintiffs alleged exposure to asbestos. Clearly, by failing to show any
nexus between the activities of plaintiff and PMC, he cannot establish
that PMC breached any alleged duty it may have owed him."
Hunter, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Hunter's testimony was sufficient circumstantial evidence of
the fact that PMC had not caused his injuries.
The criticism leveled at Hunter focused on its holding
that ". . . PMC could effectively show that the elements of
causation 'cannot be established' by pointing to an absence of
evidence to support this element."237 Conversely, in Addy v.
Bliss & Glennon,238 the court interpreted the 1992 amendment
as requiring the defendant to make "an affirmative showing
in support of his or her motion. ""' Citing Hagen, the Addy
court went on to point out that:
[S]uch a showing connotes something significantly more
than simply 'pointing out to the.., court' that 'there is an
absence of evidence': before the burden of producing even
a prima facie case should be shifted to the plaintiff in
advance of trial, a defendant who cannot negate an
element of the plaintiffs case should be required to
produce direct or circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff
not only does not have but cannot reasonably expect to
240
obtain a prima facie case.
However, not even in federal practice is it enough to
simply argue that the court should grant the motion for
summary judgment 241 and, more importantly, Hunter did not
hold that on the issue of causation argument alone was
sufficient. The court in Hunter had before it a motion that
was based on an evidentiary showing from Hunter's
deposition. And given such an evidentiary showing, it was
certainly appropriate for the moving party in Hunter to argue
- or "point" to - the absence of evidence on the issue of
causation. This appears to be the view expressed by the court
of appeals in Lloyd's of London.242 In this case, the court held
that no California court, including the court in Hunter, has
ever held that under California law it is enough for the
moving party to contend, without evidentiary support, that
the opponent of the motion cannot support its case with any
evidence.243
However, even if their criticism of Hunter is not
237. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
238. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Ct. App. 1996).
239. Id. at 647.
240. Id.
241. See discussion supra Part I.B.
242. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821, 822 (Ct. App. 1997).
243. See id. at 826.
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warranted, both Addy and Hagen are correct in their
observation that California law requires that the defendant
moving for summary judgment must produce some evidence
in support of the motion. "
3. On a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Production
Burden Stays with the Party Who Has It at Trial
In Hunter,"" the court recognized that one of the effects of
the 1992 amendment was to leave the burden of production in
a motion for summary judgment on the party who bears that
burden at trial.46 This is another way of expressing the
change effected by the 1992 amendment. Previously, under
Barnes, the party moving for summary judgment had to
shoulder the production burden even if it would not have that
burden at trial.4 After subdivision (n)48 was enacted, this
was no longer true.
However, the ink was not yet dry on the Union Bank
decision when Hunter was argued and decided. 49 Thus, the
plaintiff in Hunter was emboldened to contend that Barnes
should be followed and that the defendant should have the
duty of "affirmatively disproving" the element of causation in
the plaintiffs case. 5° In rejecting this plea, the Hunter court
made a significant observation about the burden of
production and summary judgment. 51 Pointing to Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett,251 the court explained that if the "nonmoving
party bears the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the
moving party need not support its summary judgment motion
with evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case to satisfy its burden.""' This observation
recognized that the burden of production is not reallocated to
the party moving for summary judgment simply because it
244. See Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Ct. App. 1995); Addy,
51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b) (West 2000).
245. Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995).
246. See id. at 337.
247. See discussion supra Part I.C.
248. Subdivision (n) became subdivision (o) in 1993.
249. The opinions in Union Bank and Hunter were filed on January 12, 1995
and August 23, 1995, respectively. See supra Part I.F. for a detailed discussion
of the holding in Union Bank.
250. See Hunter, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337.
251. See id. at 339.
252. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
253. Hunter, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339 (emphasis added).
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was making the motion.
Later, Hunter returned to this point in response to the
plaintiffs argument that Union Bank converted summary
judgment into "disguised discovery." The plaintiffs argument
on this score appears to have been that permitting the
moving party to "simply point" to the absence of evidence
made it incumbent on the nonmovant to disclose its entire
case and that this could lead to abuse and harassment.
However, having previously acknowledged that the 1992 and
1993 amendments wrought an important change in California
summary judgment, the Hunter court held that "[t]he change
is not disguised discovery but simply places the burden of
demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact on the
party who bears the burden of proof of that fact at tria"
2 4
On the other hand, in Certain Underwriters255 the court
expressed a reservation about the point that the burden of
production remains with the party to whom it is originally
allocated and that it is not reallocated to the party moving for
summary judgment for the purposes of the motion. 56 In
pointing to the differences between summary judgment under
California law and under federal law and practice, the court
in Certain Underwriters observed that, unlike federal
summary judgment, section 437c as amended in 1992 and
1993 does not impose the "burden of proof' for summary
judgment on the party who bears the burden at trial "without
regard to which party moves for summary judgment."257 The
court explained that in California the burden of proof on
summary judgment or summary adjudication is not the same
as the burden of proof at trial. 58  In support of this
contention, the court pointed to Evidence Code sections 500
and 550 and subdivision (o) of section 437c. 59
254. Id. at 337.
255. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821 (Ct. App. 1997).
256. See id. at 825.
257. Id. at 826.
258. See id.
259. See id. Evidence Code section 500 provides that a party has the burden
of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is "essential to the
claim for relief or defense that he is asserting." CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West
2000). Evidence code section 550 addresses the burden of production.
Subdivision (a) of section 550 provides that the burden of production "as to a
particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be
required in the absence of further evidence," and subdivision (b) allocates the
burden of production to the party with the burden of proof. Id. at § 550(a)-(b).
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The implication of this observation of the court in Certain
Underwriters is that section 437c imposes certain burdens on
the party moving for summary judgment even if that party
does not have the production burden at trial.
The implication is correct. While subdivision (b) of
section 437c imposes obligations on the moving party that
federal practice does not impose,260 it is also true that only the
burden to produce evidence is involved in motions for
summary judgment and not the burden of proof.26' For
example, subsection (o) of section 437c does not speak of the
"burden of proof' but rather of the "burden of showing that
there is no defense to a cause of action" or the "burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit."62 Neither
burden is the same as the "burden of proof' in its primary
263
sense.
This, however, does not mean, and the court in Certain
Underwriters did not hold, that the burden of production is
reallocated to the party moving for summary judgment
simply because it is making a motion for summary judgment.
As the court of appeals showed in Hunter... one of the effects
of the 1992 and 1993 amendments was to leave the
production burden with the party that will have it at trial.26'
A re-allocation of the burden of production to the party
moving for summary judgment simply because it is making
the motion would resurrect Barnes and nullify the 1992 and
1993 amendments to section 437c. In Leslie G. v. Superior
Court,266 the same panel of the court of appeals that decided
Certain Underwriters expressed support for the principle that
on a motion for summary judgment, the burden of production
remains with the party who has it at trial.2 7
260. There are no requirements in federal practice to file a statement of
material facts claimed to be undisputed, to respond to such a statement, and to
support the statement and the response thereto with references to the evidence,
as there are under subdivision (b) of section 437c.
261. See discussion supra Part I.C.
262. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1)-(2) (West 2000).
263. See discussion supra Part I.C.
264. Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995).
265. See id. at 337.
266. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Ct. App. 1996).
267. See id. at 791.
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4. If Circumstantial Evidence Is Presented in Support of
or in Opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Inference Urged by the Proponent Must be More
Probable Than the Conflicting Inference.
There are three possibilities when a party relies on
circumstantial evidence. The inference the proponent urges
may be more probable than the conflicting inference, it may
be as probable as the conflicting inference, or it may be less
probable than the conflicting inference. It is only in the first
of these three situations that the proponent's evidence is
sufficient.268
Cases decided by the courts of appeals since 1993 provide
illustrations of all three of the preceding scenarios and
confirm important and familiar rules about circumstantial
evidence in the context of motions for summary judgment.
Leslie G.2"9 is the leading case on the application of the
settled rules of circumstantial evidence to motions for
summary judgment. In this case, the inference urged by the
plaintiff nonmovant, who had the burden of production, was
less probable than the conflicting inference and, therefore,
fatal to the opposition of the motion.270
The plaintiff in Leslie G. attempted to show a landlord's
negligence in not repairing a broken security gate in the
garage of an apartment building caused her rape by an
unknown assailant.71 The defendant supported its motion for
summary judgment with the deposition testimony of the
investigating police officers and the plaintiffs expert that it
was not known how the assailant entered the garage."'
Plaintiffs evidentiary fact was of course the broken gate and
plaintiffs expert sought to infer from this that the assailant
had entered through this gate.273 The evidentiary facts on
which the defendant based its inference that the broken gate
was not where the assailant entered were that there were
other doors leading into the garage, that these doors,
although usually locked, were sometimes left propped open by
268. See discussion supra Part I.C.
269. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785.
270. See id. at 791.
271. See id. at 786-88.
272. See id.
273. See id.
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the tenants.274 The defendant also argued the possibility that
the rapist had a key to one of these doors and the possibility
that the rapist had been let into the building.275
The court noted that the burden of proof on the causation
issue was on the plaintiff, "[alithough the case is before us on
an appeal from a summary judgment."276 This conforms with
the holding of Hunter that the burden of proof remains with
the party who has it at trial.277 After stating that the
defendant's showing was adequate, the court turned to the
plaintiffs burden. 78 In doing so, the court set forth, in
unmistakable terms, the burden of a party who relies on
circumstantial evidence.279 It was not enough for the plaintiff
274. See Leslie G. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786-88 (Ct. App.
1996).
275. See id.
276. Id. at 791.
277. See Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 336-37 (Ct.
App. 1995).
278. Leslie G., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
279. The court in Leslie G. said,
[I]n deciding whether a plaintiff has met her burden of proof, we
consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from both kinds of evidence, giving full
consideration to the negative and affirmative inferences to be drawn
from all of the evidence, including that which has been produced by the
defendant. (Williams v. Barnett (1955) 135 Cal. App. 2d 607, 612 [287
P.2d 789]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Introduction of Evidence at
Trial, §§ 1795-1797, pp. 1752-1756.) [Para.] We will not, however, draw
inferences from thin air. Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to prove an
essential element of her case by circumstantial evidence, she cannot
recover merely by showing that the inferences she draws from those
circumstances are consistent with her theory. Instead, she must show
that the inferences favorable to her are more reasonable or probable
than those against her. (See San Joaquin Grocery Co. v. Trewhitt
(1926) 80 Cal. App. 371, 375-376 [252 P. 332] [if it appears that the
facts from which an inference is drawn, although consistent with that
theory, are equally consistent with some other theory, they do not
support the theory contended for]; Estate of Moore (1923) 65 Cal. App.
29, 33 [223 P. 73] [where the only evidence gives rise to conflicting
evidence, there is no proof, only guesses and conjecture].) [2c] Since
there is no direct evidence that the rapist entered or departed through
the broken gate (or even that the broken gate was the only way he
could have entered or departed), Leslie cannot survive summary
judgment simply because it is possible that he might have entered
through the broken gate. (Brautigam v. Brooks (1964) 227 Cal. App. 2d
547, 556 [38 Cal. Rptr. 784] [an inference cannot be based upon mere
possibility]; Estate of Gutierrez (1961) 189 Cal. App. 2d 165, 173 [11
Cal. Rptr. 51] [it is axiomatic that an inference may not be based on
suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, surmise, conjecture or
guesswork]; Reese v. Smith (1937) 9 Cal. 2d 324, 328 [70 P.2d 933] [a
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to show that the evidentiary circumstances were consistent
with her theory. The plaintiff had to show that the inferences
favorable to her were more reasonable or probable than those
against her.8' The court concluded that the inference
propounded by the plaintiff was conjectural and based on
speculation."' In other words, the inference that the plaintiff
sought to draw was not evenly balanced with that on which
the defendant relied. Thus, the plaintiff had not produced
sufficient evidence."' Since the plaintiff, as the opponent of
the motion, could not show that her case was supported by
sufficient evidence, there were no material issues of fact to be
tried and the motion for summary judgment had to be
granted.
If the inferences are evenly balanced, the moving party's
showing is insufficient. A case that provides a good
illustration of evenly balanced inferences is Scheiding v.
Dinwiddie Construction Co."' where the court of appeals set
out to determine the quantum of "evidence that must be
"shown" to support a summary judgment motion in order to
require the party opposing the motion to take up the burden
of producing countervailing evidence."2 4 In this case, the
plaintiffs sued for injuries inflicted by, inter alia, the
Dinwiddie Construction Company who had allegedly exposed
Mr. Scheiding to asbestos during his work as a laborer and
electrician.285
The defendant moved for summary judgment and
supported that motion with Mr. Scheiding's interrogatory
responses and references to his deposition.286  The
interrogatory responses failed to identify any job site where
the defendant had been the general contractor. During the
plaintiffs deposition that Dinwiddie had attended, Mr.
Scheiding never mentioned the Dinwiddie Construction
judgment cannot be based on guesses or conjecture]; Krause v. Apodaca
(1960) 186 Cal. App. 2d 413, 418 [9 Cal. Rptr. 10] [inferences must be
drawn from evidence and not based on mere speculation as to
probabilities without evidence]).
Id. at 791-92.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 795.
282. See discussion supra Part I.C.
283. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360 (Ct. App. 1999).
284. Id. at 361.
285. See id. at 362.
286. See id.
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Company.287
"Essentially, Dinwiddie's motion was based on the
declaration of defense counsel stating that [Mr. Scheiding]
failed to ever mention Dinwiddie in the course of discovery."288
It is undisputed that during the deposition neither Dinwiddie,
nor any other defendant, ever asked [Mr. Scheiding] to
identify any jobsite where Dinwiddie had been present. In
fact, Dinwiddie asked no questions at the deposition and
conducted no other discovery.289
Although it is unclear precisely what fact or facts the
defendant contended were undisputed, it appears that the
defendant propounded as an undisputed fact that it had not
caused the plaintiffs injuries.29 ° The plaintiffs failure to
identify the Dinwiddie Construction Company was, in
substance, the evidentiary fact from which the defendant
sought to draw the inference that Mr. Scheiding had never
shared a worksite with Dinwiddie. This in turn "supported"
the fact claimed to be undisputed that Dinwiddie had not
caused Mr. Scheiding's injuries. The plaintiffs opposed the
motion by claiming that the construction company had not
carried the statutory burden of "showing" that the element of
causation could not be established.29' They took the position
that Dinwiddie was required to make an "affirmative"
showing and could not limit itself to the simple claim that the
plaintiffs had no evidence. The plaintiffs went so far as not to
dispute Dinwiddie's statement of undisputed fact, except to
point out that Robert Scheiding had never been asked
whether Dinwiddie was a general contractor at any site
where Mr. Scheiding had worked. The plaintiffs maintained
adamantly in the trial court292 and on appeal293 that reliance
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 362 (Ct.
App. 1999).
290. "Dinwiddie's motion for summary judgment . . . argued lack of
causation." Id.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 362.
After issuing a tentative ruling to grant the motion, the court inquired
why the plaintiffs had not submitted any declaration saying they could
identify Dinwiddie. Counsel ... Gregory Sheffer [] explained his office
had decided against it: "Because had we done that, it would have
encouraged Defendants to come and do the same thing. Simply do no
discovery, do nothing else, and just say the Plaintiffs don't have any
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on Mr. Scheiding's deposition was not enough to "show" that
there was no triable issue of fact.29'
Scheiding turned on the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence propounded by the moving party. Defendant urged
the court to draw the inference from the plaintiffs' discovery
responses that Mr. Scheiding had never shared a work site
with Dinwiddie. But there were two plausible inferences to
be drawn from the circumstance that the plaintiffs' discovery
responses, including Mr. Scheiding's deposition, never
mentioned Dinwiddie. One was that the plaintiffs' failure to
identify Dinwiddie was due to the fact that Mr. Scheiding had
never been on a worksite with Dinwiddie. The other
inference was that since there were "hundreds" of defendants,
the plaintiffs could not be expected to name Dinwiddie unless
they were specifically asked to do so. It appears that both
inferences were equally reasonable or probable.
The court noted that in previous cases where the moving
party had relied on inadequate discovery responses, the
discovery requests had been broad enough to require the
nonmovant to disclose all of its evidence. 95 Thus, when, as in
Union Bank, the nonmovant had been asked to "state all
facts" on which it based a given contention it could be
reasonably inferred that the plaintiff had no facts on a given
issue.296 This had not happened in Scheiding. Not only had
the moving party failed to propound "state all facts"
discovery, it had not even made the simple request that the
plaintiffs identify worksites Mr. Scheiding had shared with
Dinwiddie. The plaintiffs had not been asked to disclose all
the evidence they had on this issue. Thus, it was at least as
plausible as not that they did not name Dinwiddie because
they had not been asked.
The gist of the court of appeals's opinion about the
evidence. We are not going to do any work. They have to prepare an
opposition." Subdivision (o)(2) of section 437c, he maintained, had not
been satisfied because "no discovery specific to this issue was
conducted" and Dinwiddie had not made an "affirmative" showing.
293. "On appeal ... [pilaintiffs contend that without the deposition having
particularly addressed Dinwiddie's presence or absence from the jobsites, the
initial burden could have been met." Id. at 363.
294. See id.
295. See Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 371-72 (Ct.
App. 1999).
296. See id. (citing Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 655-
57 (Ct. App. 1995)).
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defendant's showing was that it was "entirely possible that
plaintiffs could have supplied further information concerning
Dinwiddie."2 7 If this inference was "entirely possible," it was
at least as probable as the inference urged by the construction
company that plaintiffs had no evidence. Thus, the evidence
on which Dinwiddie relied, that the inference that Mr.
Scheiding had never shared a work site with him because he
did not voluntarily name the construction company in the
discovery responses, was insufficient evidence to support a
motion for summary judgment. 98
Scheiding highlights the principle that when the
probabilities are evenly balanced and two inferences are
equally plausible, the evidence is insufficient.29 9 It is not
enough that the probabilities are balanced, the proponent
must show that the inference on which he is relying is more
probable than the one against him. °00 Unfortunately, the
court in Scheiding01 slipped away from the rule that when
the inferences are evenly balanced, the proponent's evidence
is insufficient. The Scheiding court concluded that Dinwiddie
had not presented evidence but merely argued that the
plaintiffs had no evidence,02 a proposition flatly contradicted
by the circumstance that Dinwiddie did present evidence in
the form of interrogatory responses and Mr. Scheiding's
deposition.03 The correct result for the right reason eluded
297. Id. The court said,
[Tihe deposition and standard interrogatories in this case did not
contain questions aimed specifically at the presence or absence of
Dinwiddie at jobsites, and neither of these discovery devices was
comparable to an "all facts" interrogatory on the subject. Dinwiddie's
presence was key to liability, and Dinwiddie could have pursued
further discovery. It is entirely possible plaintiffs could have supplied
further information concerning Dinwiddie. After all, their answers to
the standard interrogatories detailed over 100 jobsites and work dates
over a period of 42 years. And Mr. Scheiding's subsequent deposition,
which Dinwiddie attended, spanned five days. This situation is easily
distinguished from the cases on which Dinwiddie relies, in those cases
the courts could infer from an incomplete or evasive reply that the
plaintiffs had no other facts to support their case.
Id. at 372-73 (emphasis added).
298. See id.
299. See, eg., Leslie G. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 791 (Ct. App.
1996).
300. See id.
301. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360 (Ct. App. 1999).
302. See id. at 373.
303. See id. at 362.
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the court in Scheiding and left only the correct result for the
wrong reason.
The situation is of course far simpler when the defendant
moving for summary judgment propounds no evidence, direct
or circumstantial, that an element of the plaintiffs claim is
not supported by any evidence. Such was the case in Lloyd's
of London."°' In this case, the plaintiff sued an insurer for its
alleged failure to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in
several environmental contamination actions." 5 The insurer
had declined coverage because the plaintiff had no insurable
interest in the properties that were the subject of the
underlying litigation while the policies had been in effect." 6
The insurer contended that the policies had been in effect
only for "finite policy periods" which did not cover the times
that the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the properties
in question that were the subject matter of the several
environmental contamination actions.0 7
The questions at issue in the case were when the policies
were in effect and what were the terms of the policies when
they were in effect.38  The insurer moved for summary
judgment, but "did not submit copies of the insurance policies
or any evidence of the allegedly 'finite' policy period or of the
terms and conditions of those policies."9 In fact, very little
was known about the policies. 10  The plaintiff opposed
summary judgment, contending that the insurer had failed to
meet its initial "burden of proof' because it had not submitted
the policies or any other proof that would suggest that the
plaintiff would be unable to establish coverage."'The insurer's motion for summary judgment relied on the
304. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 822.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 823.
309. Id.
310. See Lloyd's of London, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826. As the court stated,
We do not know (as [defendant] Lowsley-Williams seems to know or
assume) that they are comprehensive general liability policies. We do
not know whether they are occurrence policies. We do not know what
provisions, if any, they might contain that would be relevant to a
decision about whether or when it was that SoCalGas had to have an
"insurable interest" in the properties that are the subject of the
underlying actions.
Id.
311. See id. at 822.
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plaintiffs complaint, which alleged that the insurer had
issued "various excess liability policies." 12 The complaint
alleged the policy numbers and the policy period for each
policy, which was "a procedure adopted because there are
more than 40 underlying actions involving many carriers and
policies issued over a period of 15 years."13 The insurer
contended that these allegations were judicial admissions and
that no further evidence of policy periods was required. ' 4 The
complaint, however, did not allege the dates in which the
policies were in effect, nor did the moving party supply these
dates.315 The fact that the motion claimed was undisputed
was that the policies had not been in effect when the plaintiff
had an insurable interest in the properties that were the
subject matter of the underlying litigation.16 The only
evidence that could have supported these facts was the actual
dates that the policies were in effect. And this evidence was
completely missing.317
The court noted that there was no case, even after the
1992 and 1993 amendments, that held that "section 437c
permits the moving defendant to meet its initial burden
without any showing at all."318 The court concluded that the
moving party must make an initial evidentiary showing.1 9
This, of course, is correct. Subsection (b) of section 437c
requires the party moving for summary judgment to support
facts claimed to be undisputed with evidence. °
The approach taken by some courts, that the moving
party must make a "prima facie" case showing that the
plaintiffs case cannot be established, is entirely consistent
with the rule that the party moving for summary judgment
must rely on inferences that are more probable than the
opponent's.2 This is the equivalent of a motion based on
312. See id.
313. Id. at 823 n.2.
314. See id. at 823.
315. See id. at 823 n.2.
316. See Lloyd's of London, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827.
317. See id. at 826.
318. Id. at 823.
319. See id.
320. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b) (West 2000).
321. See Allyson v. Department of Transp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 498 (Ct.
App. 1997); see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 378
(Ct. App. 2000); cf. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wallace, 75 P.2d 942, 947 (Or. 1938)(A "prima facie" case is one where the evidence is sufficient to establish a given
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circumstantial evidence where the movant has shown that
the inference on which it relies is more probable or reasonable
than the conflicting inference. Unless contradicted, such an
inference will support a judgment in favor of the party urging
the inference.
5. A Summary Judgment Motion Against a Party Who
Bears the Burdens of Proof and Production Must be
Supported by Sufficient Evidence
The courts of appeals have interpreted the 1992 and 1993
amendments to require an evidentiary showing on the part of
the moving party.22 This conforms to subdivision (b) of
section 437c, which requires the party moving for summary
judgment to support each fact clamed to be undisputed with
references to the evidence.323
Since the moving party must make an evidentiary
showing, the question is what standard determines the
sufficiency of that showing. As we have seen, when the
motion is made against the party with the production burden,
the showing in support of the motion must rest on sufficient
evidence of material facts.324 Since this is not entirely obvious,
there has been some vacillation between a recognition that
the Barnes standard is now defunct and no longer binding
and an almost intuitive "sense" that the moving party must
surely make some sort of a showing, even in the post-Barnes
world. However, the search for an acceptable standard has
produced some decisions that suggest standards that exceed
the requirement of producing sufficient evidence in support of
the summary judgment motion. That is, there have been
some decisions that set a standard that is perilously close to
requiring evidence that shifts the production burden. While
there is nothing objectionable about the moving party
voluntarily propounding evidence probative enough to shift
the production burden even if it does not have that burden,
imposing such a burden on the party without that burden
resurrects Barnes and renders the 1992 and 1993
amendments meaningless.
fact and which will remain sufficient to sustain a judgment unless it is
contradicted).
322. See discussion supra Part I.F.2.
323. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b).
324. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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Villa v. McFerren315 is one such decision that looks
strikingly similar to the Barnes ruling. The action in Villa
was brought for civil conspiracy against a psychiatrist who
the plaintiff alleged had conspired with his disability insurer
to deprive him of his disability benefits."6 The insurer had
scheduled a psychiatric examination of the plaintiff with the
defendant. On February 6, 1992, the plaintiff showed up for
the examination with a tape recorder but the defendant
refused to proceed with the recorder on.3"' The defendant
eventually ordered the plaintiff to leave and reported to the
insurer that the plaintiff had cancelled the appointment.2 9
The insurer terminated benefits because the plaintiff had
failed to submit to an independent psychiatric examination.3 °
The material fact that the defendant claimed was
undisputed was that the defendant had not participated in a
conspiracy to inflict severe emotional distress on the
plaintiff. 13 ' The only competent evidence that the defendant
cited in support of this material fact was the plaintiffs
deposition testimony that as of February 6, 1992, the plaintiff
did not know how many communications the defendant had
with the insurer; and that the only letter the plaintiff had
seen was the letter dated January 8, 1992, from the insurer to
the defendant, requesting the defendant to perform the
psychiatric examination.332
325. 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (Ct. App. 1995).
326. See id. at 720-21.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 721.
331. See Villa, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
332. See id. at 723. The court said,
The deposition testimony was as follows: "[Q] ... [Alm I also correct
that as of February 6, 1992, [the date of plaintiffs appointment with
defendant] you didn't know how many communications [defendant had
with the insurer] or what the extent of that communication was? [ T
[A] Exactly. [ 1 [Q] As of today, as you sit here today, the only
communication, which you are aware of between Dr. McFerren's office
and Minnesota Mutual [the insurer], which communications took place
on or prior to February 6, 1992, is this letter? [ 1 [A] Yes, this letter is
the only letter that I have seen. As my counsel said, I saw this today.
It is a communication between Minnesota Mutual and the doctor. The
letter plaintiff referred to in his deposition testimony set forth the
background of the disability claim and requested defendant perform a
psychiatric examination.
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The inference that the defendant sought to draw was that
the defendant had not conspired with the plaintiffs disability
insurer to deprive him of his disability benefits."' The
evidentiary facts upon which this inference was based was
that the plaintiff did not know how many communications
defendant had had with the insurer and that, at the time of
his deposition, the plaintiff had seen only one letter
exchanged between the defendant and the insurer."' But on
these facts it is at least as probable, and very possibly less
probable, that the defendant did not conspire with the
insurer. If it was not known how many, if any,
communications had taken place between the defendant and
the insurer, and there was only one letter of neutral content
from the insurer to the defendant,335 the inference that the
defendant did not conspire with the insurer was at least as
likely, if not less likely, than the inference that he did engage
in a conspiracy. Thus, since the moving party's evidence was
insufficient, the moving party's showing was inadequate and
the motion should have been denied.
The court of appeals reached the same conclusion. The
court concluded that the defendant's evidence was inadequate
because it "failed to contain a declaration or similar evidence
proving no agreement or conspiracy existed."36 The only
evidence the defendant had presented was that the plaintiff
was "unaware of communication between the defendant and
[the insurer] other than a letter" plaintiff was shown on the
day of the deposition. Since it was unlikely that the plaintiff
would have been present during any communications
between the defendant and the insurer, this evidence by itself
was insufficient.
3 7
The court then described what would have been an
adequate showing.338 The court held that a declaration by the
defendant that he had had no communication with the
insurer prior to January 8, 1992, that he had never entered
into an agreement with the insurer to prepare an inaccurate
report, or that he never agreed to prepare a report adverse to
333. See id. at 730.
334. See id. at 722-23.
335. See id. at 722.
336. Id. at 729.
337. See Villa, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723.
338. See id. at 729.
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the plaintiff but favorable to the insurer's interests, would
have been adequate to show no conspiracy existed.39 At the
most, the offering of this evidence would have entitled the
defendant to judgment, at the least, this would have shifted
the burden to the plaintiff to show that the defendant never
entered into an agreement with the insurer to prepare an
inaccurate report and never agreed to prepare a report
adverse to the plaintiff but favorable to the insurer's
interests.34 ° In other words, the showing that the court of
appeals required of the moving party was tantamount to
requiring the moving defendant to produce enough evidence
to shift the burden of production.
Although the plaintiff did not prevail, 4' the import of the
court's decision in Villa was to weaken the 1992 and 1993
amendments to section 437c. Requiring the party that does
not have the burden of production to propound evidence
probative enough to entitle it to judgment is exactly the rule
that the legislature intended to abrogate by the 1992
amendment.
Assume that instead of the plaintiffs evasive answer that
he had seen no letters other than the January 8, 1992,
letter,4 the plaintiff had been asked to state all facts upon
which the allegation of a conspiracy was based and that he
could only point to the January 8, 1992, letter. As in Union
Bank, this would certainly be circumstantial evidence that
the plaintiff had no evidence of a conspiracy.
The answer to ensuring an adequate showing in support
of a motion for summary judgement is not to increase the
evidentiary burden on the moving party but to require the
moving party to lay a sound groundwork for the motion. In
the absence of direct evidence, the moving party must prepare
a sound circumstantial case. This requires discovery that is
339. See id.
340. See id. at 730.
341. See id. at 731. The court went on to find that defendant's deposition
testimony, which plaintiff had introduced, showed that defendant had not
spoken with the insurer, did not even know why the insurer picked him to
conduct the examination and that this showed that the conspiracy "could not be
established." See id.
342. See id. at 723. The plaintiff had been asked in his deposition whether
the only communication of which he was aware was the January 8, 1992, letter
from the insurer to the defendant. The plaintiffs answer was not responsive.
He stated that this was the only letter he had seen. This certainly had no
bearing on whether a conspiracy existed.
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tailored to the moving party's theory of the case. In Villa, it
would have included "state all facts" discovery on the issue of
the alleged conspiracy.
6. A Defendant Moving for Summary Judgment on an
Issue on Which It Has the Burdens of Proof and
Production Must Present Evidence of Sufficient
Weight to Shift the Burden of Production
We have seen that subsection (1) of subdivision (o)
requires the plaintiff to produce evidence that not only
satisfies the production burden but is of such weight that it
shifts the production burden to the defendant.343 The reason
for this is that if the plaintiff does nothing more than to
propound evidence that is legally sufficient, it is possible that
the defendant has evidence that contradicts the plaintiffs
evidence.3" Granting summary judgment under such
circumstances would of course be improper. Thus, the party
with the burden of proof and the burden of production at trial,
the plaintiff, must produce evidence sufficient to shift the
burden of production. This is evidence of such weight that,
unless it is contradicted, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
There are circumstances, however, under which it is the
defendant who has the burden of proof and the burden of
production. The best illustration of this is where the
defendant asserts an affirmative defense. 45
Here the rule should be the same as it is for plaintiffs
under subsection (1) of subdivision (o). If the defendant bases
its motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense,
it should do more than support the motion with sufficient
evidence. Evidence that is sufficient does not exclude the
possibility that the plaintiff has evidence that contradicts the
defendant's evidence.4 6 Thus, judgment cannot be entered for
the defendant based on sufficient evidence. Like the plaintiff,
a defendant with the burden of proof and the production
burden should be required to produce evidence that shifts the
production burden to the plaintiff. That is, the evidence
343. See discussion supra Part I.D.
344. See discussion supra Part I.D.
345. See CAL. EVID. CODE. § 500 (West 2000). ("Except as otherwise provided
by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or
nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is
asserting").
346. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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supporting the affirmative defense should be of such weight
that, unless that evidence is contradicted, the defendant is
entitled to judgment.
The courts of appeals have supported this view. It has
been held that the defendant must present evidence of each
essential element of the defense on which it bears the burden
of proof.47 Furthermore, evidence supporting the affirmative
defense must be of such probative force as to sustain a
judgment in the defendant's favor.348 Hagen demonstrates the
extent of the burden that must be met when the defendant
moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense
under which it bears the burdens of proof and production. 49
In Hagen, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the
theory that there was a complete defense to the action.35° In
such a case, the defendant will have the burden of proof and
the production burden at trial.35' Interestingly, however, the
production burden was allocated to the defendant in Hagen,
not because of the assertion of an affirmative defense, but
because a presumption placed the production burden on the
defendant.35
Hagen was an action over the validity of a trust brought
by two grandchildren against the cousin of the decedent.353
The latter, Terry Hickenbottom, had received almost all of the
property under a revocable living trust. " The grandchildren
sued to set aside the trust on the theory that Hickenbottom
had exercised undue influence over the decedent. 5
Hickenbottom moved for summary judgment and summary
347. See Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18 (Ct. App.
1997) ("[The defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts
support each element of the affirmative defense.").
348. See Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 298 (Ct. App. 1993)
(There is no obligation on the plaintiffs part to establish anything by affidavit
unless and until defendant has stated facts establishing every element of the
affirmative defense necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor).
349. See Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 198-99 (Ct. App.
1995).
350. See id. "A defendant ... has met his or her burden of showing that a
cause of action has no merit if that party has shown.., that there is a complete
defense to that cause of action." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(2) (West 2000).
351. See WEIL, supra note 124, at 10.247.
352. See Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204, 208.
353. See id. at 198-99.
354. See id.
355. See id.
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adjudication 56 on the ground that her privilege to speak the
truth was a complete defense to the action.357 The trial court
concluded that the "defense of truth" privilege constituted a
complete defense and entered summary judgment for
Hickenbottom.5 8
For a variety of reasons not pertinent hereto, the court of
appeals disagreed that this defense was available.359 This
alone could have led to a reversal since the defendant could of
course no longer rely on this defense as a matter of law.
However, on appeal the defendant also contended that the
plaintiffs, in opposing the motion for summary judgment,
should have "set forth facts to support their first amended
complaint."6 °  Relying expressly on Union Bank, the
defendant contended she was not "required to prove the
absence of material facts" and that her burden was to set
forth the defense of truth and "point out to the court that no
material facts have been presented" by the plaintiffs.6 '
Hickenbottom's argument misconstrued Union Bank to
have adopted the federal rule, which does not require the
moving party to make any evidentiary showing in support of
356. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(f)(1), which explains summary
adjudication as follows:
A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes
of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or
more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party
contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no
affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative
defense to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a
claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or
that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be
granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an
affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.
357. See Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 203-04.
360. Id. at 203.
361. Id. at 207. The court said,
In this court, Hickenbottom argues on the basis of Union Bank that she
"has made an adequate 'showing... that [the grandson] has offered no
evidence whatsoever that [Hickenbottom] did or said anything wrong.
The Union Bank case now confirms what [Hickenbottom] has
maintained throughout her opposition, namely that she is not required
to prove the absence of material facts. Rather, her burden, which she
has fully met, is simply to set forth her affirmative defense of truth and
point out to the court that no material facts have been presented by
[the grandson].
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the argument that the nonmovant's case is not supported by
any evidence.36  The moving party had made a solid
evidentiary showing in Union Bank,"'3 and Union Bank had
not dispensed with the need for such a showing.
Be that as it may, it turned out that Hickenbottom had
the production burden on the issue of undue influence and the
validity of the trust. 6" The court of appeals noted that certain
foundational facts activate a presumption of undue influence
that, "at trial, would operate to shift the burden of proof to
the proponent of the trust or will."365 This meant that
Hickenbottom had the burdens of proof and of production on
the issue of the validity of the trust. Hickenbottom had not
attempted to negate the foundational facts that created the
presumption of undue influence or show that these
foundational facts could not be established. 66 Thus, the
presumption applied and Hickenbottom was the party with
the production burden.367  In support of the motion for
summary judgment, Hickenbottom had submitted a showing
that related the course and history of the relationship
between the decedent, the grandchildren, and
Hickenbottom."' The showing was quite detailed and
included medical testimony that the decedent's mental
capacity was sound at the time she executed the trust that
was the subject of the action.369 In fact, it included evidence
that one of the plaintiffs had stated that a full eighteen
months after the decedent executed the trust in question, she
never observed the decedent being weak minded or unable to
make decisions or speak her mind. 6
If Hickenbottom did not have the burden of production on
the issue of undue influence and the validity of the trust, it is
likely the showing that she submitted in support of the
362. See supra note 16.
363. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
364. See Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09.
365. Id. at 202-03, 208. These foundational facts are: existence of a
confidential relationship between the testator and the person alleged to have
exerted undue influence, active participation by the latter in the preparation or
execution of the will, and undue profit accruing to that person. Hickenbottom
qualified on all three counts. See id.
366. See id. at 208.
367. See id.
368. See id. at 199-201.
369. See id.
370. See Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 199-201.
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motion would have been sufficient evidence that the decedent
had executed the trust out of her own free will and free of
Hickenbottom's influence. Thus, if the plaintiffs bore the
production burden on these issues and moved for summary
judgment, medical testimony as to the decedent's competence
and the granddaughter's corroborating testimony would have
been substantial evidence that would have defeated the
motion.
However, by virtue of the presumption, Hickenbottom
had the burden of production on the issues of undue influence
and the validity of the trust. Thus, as the party moving for
summary judgment, she had to present sufficient evidence to
sustain a judgment in her favor. That is, Hickenbottom had
to show that the inference on which she relied, that she had
not exerted undue influence and that the trust was therefore
valid, was the only reasonable inference that could be drawn
from the evidentiary facts. And, of course, she would not be
entitled to judgment if the inference of undue influence were
as probable as the inference of no undue influence.37'
Measured against this test, Hickenbottom's showing was
insufficient. 72 She submitted no facts that bore directly on
the issue of undue influence and thus the validity of the
trust.73 For one, she failed to submit a declaration of her
own, even though she was the only witness who "was the only
percipient witness to much of what she did or did not do to
influence the decedent's estate-planning decisions." '74 Thus,
she had failed to exclude the wholly reasonable possibility
that her proximity and relationship with the decedent
allowed her to exercise undue influence. 75 Therefore, it was
not surprising that the court concluded that Hickenbottom's
showing was insufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiffs
to show that there were triable issues of material facts.76
Hagen demonstrates the need to recognize that an
exception must be made to subsection (2) of subdivision (o)
when the defendant moves for a summary judgment on an
issue, or issues, on which it has the burdens of proof and
371. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
372. See Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09.
373. See id.
374. Id. at 208.
375. See id. at 204-05, 208-09.
376. See id. at 209.
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production. When this is the case, the defendant must prove
each element of the defense with an evidentiary showing
probative enough to sustain a judgment, that is, evidence
probative enough to exclude the possibility that a rational
finder of fact could return a verdict for the defendant.
Alternatively, a judicially crafted exception to subsection (2),
subdivision (o) could be amended to predicate the operation of
this provision on the allocation of the burdens of proof and
production, rather than the position the moving party
occupies in the litigation.
II. CONCLUSION
The 1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c relieved
the party moving for summary judgment of the burden of
propounding evidence of probative force sufficient to shift the
production burden to the opponent, if the summary judgment
motion is made by the party who does not have that burden
at trial. Since 1992 it is also clear that the moving party does
not bear the production burden simply because it has brought
the summary judgment motion.
This does not relieve the moving party from its obligation
to set forth in a separate statement the material facts it
claims are undisputed and to support those facts with
references to the evidence. This evidence must be either
direct evidence of the proposition or, if circumstantial, the
inference the proponent seeks to draw must be more probable
than the conflicting inference.
If the motion for summary judgment is made by the party
who bears the burdens of proof and production, the evidence
in support of the motion must be of a probative force
sufficient to shift the burden of production to the opponent.
This is evidence of such probative force that no person can
reasonably disbelieve it in the absence of countervailing
evidence.
In laying down these rules, the 1992 and 1993
amendments to section 437c have brought summary
judgment into alignment with the concept of the burden of
production and with the shifting of that burden. This is an
important step in the development of summary judgment in
California.
Quite apart from the important technical innovations
achieved by the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c,
102 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
these amendments also provide a lesson in the development
of legal principles in a common law jurisdiction. The impetus
for these legislative enactments was a judicial decision,
Celotex Corp., and dissatisfaction with another judicially
crafted rule as expressed in Barnes. The legislature enacted
the 1992 and 1993 amendments in reaction to Celotex and
Barnes and then retired from the scene, leaving it to the
courts to test these amendments in the crucible of actual
cases. This the courts have done with some success during
the last five years. It may be that this normative dialogue
between the legislative and judicial branches illustrates one
of the great strengths of the common law.
